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DE-COGITO

Unthinking the Thought up World

CONTENTS

ENGLISH ABSTRACT

This book is an investigation of mental freedom as freedom from the thought up world and freedom to think differently. The term *unthinking* (de-cogito) is invented as to refer to the mental activity of withdrawal from the thought-up world with the aim to foster *mental freedom.*

If we unthink expectations and memories and just stay in the present, in 'now', then the very *now* disappears from the world as unrelated–a way of thinking that is alien to us. The suspension of concepts submerges us into a *pure non-thought world.* The mind is free to perceive hidden mental attitudes, linguistic forms and a new horizon of thinking and speaking.

Thereby we open the mind to foreign utterances and mental forms; we can come to know ourselves and we can see the world with different eyes. Thus we can come to know ourselves in relation to others, our culture in relation to others and our life form in the horizon of planetary life.

This investigation is in accordance with the newest attitude in philosophy (XII World Congress of Philosophy, 2008), namely–to re-think. The universal is replaced by unique, the absolute–with relative. The Western way of thinking about being and non-being, essence and nothingness, subject and object, subject and predicate is being investigated in its most significant forms. A search for the boundary between language and world is being conducted by utilizing new experimental techniques.

This is an analysis of mental forms that are focused on the Cartesian *cogito* and in the Ancient $\lambda o\gamma o\zeta$. The investigation is new in its character and does not go over the well-known analytical arguments.

Introduction

The current investigation is both local and global. It scrutinizes crucial forms of *cogito* and $\lambda o\gamma o\zeta$ in relation with non-Western forms. The aim is to perceive the Western mind and to cultivate global attitude.

Un-thinking liberates the mind by realizing the virtual-ity of cogitations. It focuses on cogitations and reveals their form and relations. The free attitude overcomes fixations on subconscious mental forms. We supervise the inclusion of words in life and we do not confuse virtual for real. This attitude of mind can be expressed in few norms:

Cleaning out non-free attitudes: 'obvious nesses', 'beliefs', and 'universalities'. Realizing spontaneous linguistic and habitual schemes of description and explanation. Fixed concepts and utterances hinder the alternative ones. Relative concepts and utterances can be changed and transformed.

Realizing local forms. Focusing on local linguistic and mental forms which reproduce Ego, community, and culture. The free attitude discovers local forms in relation to foreign ones.

Revealing the relativity of 'universalities'.

Realizing relations. Thought and speech are defined via their relations. Without relations we cannot know a single concept, assertion, theory or culture form. More often than not the awareness of those relations is only fractional and they are conceived non-relatively.

Revealing the relativity of absolutes.

Rejection of interpretations. Interpretation forms thought and speech by dint of attitude and pre-understanding. Going deep in a situation, in a conversation, or in a text requires *relocation of the mind* in the life process of the situation itself.

Avoiding debating and criticizing. Debating and criticizing accumulate misconceptions and confusions. They gravitate to Ego-forms and constitute a barrier to discovering the alternative position. There are possibilities both for unlimited argumentation and unlimited criticism. Theses are always open to 'proving' or 'refuting' by virtue of their indeterminacy.

Cross-cultural identification. A cultural form de-fines itself via the contact with another; otherwise it is unconscious and indeterminate.

The awareness of *the otherness of your own* in relation to the other delineates the first in a new manner. Only are we able to rediscover our utterances by *realizing their form.* We can attain our own fundamental concepts by relating them to alien fundamental concepts.

In this investigation thinkable things are unthinked yet the world remains intact. If there is *epoche* here, it pertains to *refraining from accepting the mental as real.*

I. EGO, GLOBALITY AND FREEDOM

Chapter 1. 'Egocogito'–non-free identity

1. Every day we affirm mentally, linguistically and behaviorally '*I am*'. This positioning of the self here in the West is insparable from the *thinking*. Rene Descartes enunciates the password with the immeasurably enormous meaning 'Ego cogito'.

If it is written *Egocogito*, we would have term for the inseparable Ego-form of the thinking Self.

2. *Ego-forms are local.* Egocogito is native identity, not a human universality. It is formed via individual biographies within the limits of a collective Western identity. The contemporary Western person is not aware of this locality and accepts Egocogito as universality. Thus we become blind to different local identities of foreign cultures.

3. *Egocogito replaces life.* In the Western world thinking is undisputed hyper value and life is its premise. This is a position not in life-and-death but in the culture. This is living in the virtual as if it was real.

4. *Homo Sapiens replace the body with an artifact.* Every being on Earth lives in a body by re-synthesizing itself from its spontaneous decay. Only a single species on the Earth, *Homo Sapiens*, survives by means of thinking and speaking and not via unmediated body activity. Objects and symbols from the bow and the monosyllabic call to the computer and the Internet are achievements of thought.

7. '*Win or lose!*'. Beyond the Atlantic the Western Ego is unfolded in thousands of competition forms, in which Ego expands itself against other Ego-s. National ideology becomes 'self-creation', 'self-assertion', 'success', and 'victory'. The inevitable polar Ego-categories then are self-destruction, self-denial, failure, loss, collapse. 'There are winners and losers'.

8. *Ego re-moves life out of meaning.* The winner-loser scheme of contemporary *Egocogito* forms all meanings and leaves *plain life out of meaning*. This is how the culture of *Ego cogito*, by removing spontaneous living, *converts meaning into non-freedom.*

These artificial meanings are imposed on life and when they fail, the life of *Egocogito* fails. But life itself has no need of such thought-up meanings.

5. *Egocogito collapses.* The thought sphere is being established in *virtual technology.* People think less; rules and machines replace thought. The gap between ego and body becomes ego-cogito gap and this is the formula of *collapse of the civilizationform egocogito.*

9. *Who lives and dies?* My 'self-creation', 'self-assertion', 'success', 'victory'? That which I have done and accomplished in my life: creations, deeds, wealth, power? Or is it my name, my opinions, habits, mental attitudes?

What is living is what is mortal and what dies in us is the creature that is mortal.

10. *Habits.* We associate thoughts by using beaten tracks–those of the person, the group, the nationality, the culture. The *language* we use contributes an essential part of all these forms of thinking and acting. Our original opinions and formed beliefs are to a great extent result of certain thought and speech vocabularies (John Dewey).The latter are not sacred; they are but fortuitous forms, molded by habits. They are void of 'Truth', 'Good', 'Beauty'; their meaning is relational. Habits get bad, unhealthy and bring suffering. Every habit could turn against us under certain circumstances. It is then that we know we are not free.

11. *Mental attitude*. Mental attitude are like 'tuning' to particular 'frequency'. *Ego* thinks, talks and acts selectively. Our unique path is navigated by unconscious and thus–by non-free attitudes. The 'existential situation' of 'free choice' and bearing 'responsibility' is reduced to a

habitual situation of following pre-fabricated patterns for which we are not responsible. This is the binding of illusionary freedom in the chains of Ego.

Just like our body cells disintegrate and reconstruct because they disintegrate, just like our thoughts disappear and rise as to preserve our orientation, so mental attitudes and mental forms sink into the unconscious and thus we are in position to strive for their realization. Our gratest need in this respect is to become aware of the origins of non-freedom.

13. *Dissolution of Ego in the perspective of mortality.* When we come to know that soon we will be gone (and we are going away anyway), we get into panic. Why it turns out that we are not ready and that our knowledge is unable to cope with the situation? Because our knowledge is thought-up and unconscious at the same time. It consists in random thoughts which turn out to be in irreconcilable conflict with the flow-out of life.

People meet the challenge of death in different manner based on how death *dissolves Ego's world.* What is thought-up does not help us in the real situation of dying and thus we die in unconquerable shock. But dying is acceptable to a free person as withdrawal into peace with the arrival of the uncontrollable, the unspeakable, the indescribable and the unthinkable.

Chapter 2. HOMO SAPIENS IS AN EARTH INHABITANT

21. The Western concepts of *man* and *animal*, *culture* and *nature*, *thinking* and *instinct* and even those of *space* and *time* are *local forms* and there is no reason for us to believe that they are universal. They are ethnocentric and inevitably 'wrong' in the same way as foreign concepts are 'wrong' for us.

23. *A gulf separates us from the rest of the life forms.* We are not able not only to commune with animals and plants but to endure any kind of proximity with them in the natural environment. We do not realize the existence of trans-human forms (David Abram).

24. *High development is a deep decline.* The most elaborate description, which is also the most massive, taken negatively, is the most profound delusion as well. Where the greatest of achievements are, there are the greatest of defeats–the sphere of the egocogito, displaced in life.

In the 'artificial intelligence' the way of thinking of living forms is identified with information processing in non-living systems. This misconception is *a dangerous utopia,* similar to the *artificial life* or *perfect society* utopias.

25. *The global situation is multicultural and crosscultural.* It relativizes local cultural forms and languages and descriptions in particular–no local language and native description can still pretend to be 'universal'. The realization of this relativity is opening towards a greater horizon.

26. *Global philosophy*. This formula is used in absolutistic contexts in the West and by dialogical ones by modern Zen-masters (Suzuki, Abe, Hisamatsu). A philosophy that is global by virtue of its intentions is necessary. This philosophy cannot be a single system but rather a meeting of a number of local investigations, each of them with realized identity, correlated with the others. The *dependence of philosophical forms upon local grammar forms* constitutes a special and very important topic that has to be realized and investigated.

28. Here I do not speak about a deconstruction of Modernity or about an exotic quest for the East but rather about *a focused examination of basic thought forms, developed in the West* in the process of looking in the polar *Far East*'s mirror. We have to realize that in the world there is no west nor east (West is to the east from the East and East is to the west from the West). Earth has no centre on its surface. After all, even the fact that we are humans and we live on Earth is a local fact.

29. *There are no privileged utterances.* The words by which the world is described can differ from philosophical categories or scientific concepts. They can be all kinds of words. *Nobody can list 'special words'* that could satisfy the privilege requirement. There are no privileged utterances. There are weaker and stronger utterances in a specific situation, there are more local and more global utterances.

30. *A person has its own place on Earth.* On the globe, everyone is 'herself'/'himself', otherwise there wouldn't be anyone present. The global situation is not without-identity but inter-identical. One is defined as person it their community, in their culture, in humanity, on Earth. You are always someone, even as a bank account titular. Ethnical identity is a special case–*it represents integral collective life.* Only in its context cultures have been developing in the full spectrum of vital activity. Every place on Earth is equally important.

31. *Local knowledge is irreplaceable* 300 000 people die during the cyclone that hit South and Southeast Asia on 16th December 2004. *Not a single scientific institution or clairvoyant did warn about this particular tsunami.* The people of the tribe 'the Great Andamanas' nevertheless survived by following their contact with animals and plants and by observing wind and water.

32. The situation is a life and death matter, just as in the case of a person whose days are numbered unless they take immediate measures. Philosophers have the constant responsibility and the necessary experience to formulate, consider and solve such questions. This requires re-thinking philosophies in the context of the current critical cross-cultural global situation.

Chapter 3. WESTERN SUMMARY

Here massive symbolical and thought forms from the past of the European culture are being investigated as thinking patterns called *cogito* and $\lambda o \gamma o \varsigma$. This is an 'archeological expedition' aimed at recognizing important concepts from our time and all the way back to Antiquity and comparing them with non-European forms from India and the Far East.

The newest enormous thinking attitudes are scientism and humanitarian ideology.

33. *Alienating caused by analytical rationality.* The alienation of philosophy from the rest of culture and of culture itself from nature is product of the scientific attitude and its close relative the analytical tradition in philosophy. Here categories such as 'objective world', 'empirical knowledge' and 'logical sequence'.

These formulations vary but the mental attitude they embody is massive and very strong–it defines thinking and acting in the *global scientific culture.* The lack of awareness of locality and relativity in them is also lack of adequate awareness of globality. This is confirmed by the deficiency which emerges when an attempt is made to determine 'logic', 'science' and 'language' in terms of their relativity and cultural boundaries. This error turns into *scientific and technocratic ideology* and generates *dangerous utopias.*

34. Wittgenstein reaches a relativity position in his *Philosophical Investigations*: 'the families of language games'. However, he does not get acquainted with the relativity which is among them. He identifies 'language game' with 'form of life'.

The problem 'life-death' is absent from analytical philosophy and in this respect the latter is sterile.

35. *The science wars*. Humanitarian and scientific ideologies mutually empower themselves in the battles between them.

The 'wars' between humanitarians and scientists based on theses in culture and science could break out again because outcome was never reached. Every philosophical thesis allows for strong defense and equally strong criticism by virtue of its relativity and indeterminacy.

36. *Analytical argumentation.* There is *fundamentalism of logic and fact* in the analytical type of argumentation. It gets stalled in immense networks of premises, definitions, conclusions and theories. In the long run it is as complicated and heterogeneous and as polyphonic and chaotic as the traditional metaphysics. There are all sorts of '-isms' developed along the lines of every single topic. The hypostasis of 'entities' such as 'statement', 'identity-contradiction', 'law-fact', 'description-explanation' is not overcome. Categorial oppositions such as 'subject-object', 'empirical-logical', 'sign-meaning' and many others are preserved without analysis.

In theoretical science itself remains the attitude towards 'explanation of everything', 'the whole', 'the absolute'–outdated thinking lines combined with the newest theoretical ideas.

37. *The humanities constitute an ideological environment.*

The fixed attitudes of humanitarian philosophy are:

1. *Everything is text.* "All cognition takes place in texts and consists of interpretation."

2. *Meaning is in the core of the text and of the world.*

3. *Man is spirit.* "Man has reason, awareness about death, feelings and perception that make him *spiritual animal,* different from all living beings. This is why man is not an animal."

However, this 'spiritual animal' breathes and feeds, suffers and dies like all the rest of the animals, and also it exhibits aggression and cruelty that are incommensurable to those of the other animals. As a matter of fact all notions of 'spirit' have their roots in 'respiration', 'breathing', 'life' and lean toward a description of an unknown form beyond death.

The destructive applications of the humanities are enormous. Despite the popular view, scientific ideology and technology are not more harmful than social ideology and technology. The damages that the latter cause are rarely recalled: indoctrinations, discriminations, cultural clashes, religious wars, utopist ideologies and political practices, totalitarian regimes. All these phenomena are 'humanitarian' as they are based on though-up conceptions about 'man', 'freedom', 'justice', 'nation'.

39. *Beyond humanitarian humanism.* Do we have to cease the 'humanism' inspired movement towards 'the language', 'the text' and 'the culture'? A philosophy that is independent of humanism as 'humanitarity' as well as of scientism as 'objective sciencefulness' is much wiser with its responsibility and involvement with world and truth.

40. *'Deconstruction'–Jacques Derrida.* Jaques Derrida's deconstruction follows Rorty's *fortuity of language and the self* in the retrospective analysis of the ethnocentrical Western philosophy of the logos. Slogan such as 'There is nothing beyond the text' immediately shows that there is no *'deconstruction' of the text itself,* there is no 'deconstruction' outside of hermeneutics and that there are text forms, relations and criticisms.

44. *Transcendental-empirical–'place' of 'Différance'.* Derrida stresses out the importance of the difference between transcendental and empirical in Husserl's phenomenology. 'Transcendental', non-relative Self is absent from the languages of the Far East, from the Indian languages, from our own languages. The difference, on which such an important emphasis is placed, is imaginary.

46. "The difference between two phonemes that makes them existent and able to function as they do cannot be heard" (Derrida, 1999, p. 771).

The focus of deconstruction is 'the differentiation which is neither a word nor a concept… which is strategically most suited to think of the most irreducible things that characterize our 'time', even if it is not able to control it." (Ibid. p. 772).

La 'Différance'–announcement: 'I applied to neographism what I will temporarily call word or concept difference and that is, as we shall see, neither word nor a concept. ' (Ibid. 769).

Here we find unique combination of relinquishing the logos and accepting the power of cogito accompanied by characterizing thinking as power, just like Foucault did. The intention of *de-cogito* is just the opposite–to free the thinking-up by *out-thinking* and thus to make it as strong as possible (Ibid. 773).

"Between' remains outside of or *unrealized in difference,* and without it the there could not be difference between forms as relativity, emptying of forms, freedom of forms and freedom to forms.

47. *Madness, λογος and cogito*–reason stands before the court. Derrida finds 'madness' in the unfolding of *λογος*. Socrates' stratum should also be penetrated if we want to see the what the situation is. This is where we find the enormous topic about *Dionysus*, *The Free One*: the Thracian Dion, Zagrey, Sabazii, a phenomenon that is not Greek and *precedes the alphabet*, and it is from the viewpoint of the Greek written culture that we recognize the 'madness' of 'Orpheic mysteries'.

Outside of Western culture we find enough evidence about the madness phenomenon and its understanding as 'unreason' or 'delusion'. It seems that madness is recognized everywhere as *taking the unreal for real* and thus as living in an isolated subjective world, which is invalid for the others.

53. *'Logos' is madness if it takes the unreal as real*. This leads us to the realization that madness is present in the very hypostasis of 'Western reason' as the Reason.

The situation with the 'madness of logos' bears a resemblance to the situation with the 'solo-ipso madness'. If we proceed from the obvious premise that objects are perceivable, the latter situation is the same as the identification of reality with 'my perception'. However, just as solipsism cannot be pursued in the natural life beyond madness, in the same way the identification of reality with language is not valid outside of madness.

55. *Absence 'is there' in relation.* When post modernistic authors ascertain *absences* in classical thinking it must be realized that these are absences only because *a free spot was now opened.*

56. *There is no 'West' without 'East'.* Derrida and all other deconstructivists of the West remain silent about the East: the Buddhist analysis and denial of metaphysics, the emptying of categories, the thematization of relativity, language and it limits. The Chinese way of thinking is also overlooked or presented via Western philosophers.

The deconstruction of Modernity and the West which is being developed by post modernistic philosophers is not understood as reaching Western mental attitudes as related to Eastern ones.

Chapter 4. PUZZLES AND WESTERN QUESTIONS

57. *'The world is a puzzle'*. The world is insusceptible to explanation, because it cannot be taken as object or subject *before* the cognizant speaking and experience. Now we also perceive the *relativity* of this phrase. Assuming insusceptibility to explanation means taking up explanatory position with insuperable barrier in front of it.

58. *Western philosophy is an ethnical form.* Speech and writing are native–Greek, German, French–and temporary: Ancient, Medieval, Modern. Philosophy, $\phi\iota\lambda o\sigma o\phi\iota\alpha$ as speech and writing is by virtue of its very name a Greek enterprise ("Was is das–Philosophie?", Heidegger 1956). 'The word $\phi\iota\lambda o\sigma o\phi\iota\alpha$ tell us that philosophy is something that inherently defines the existence of what is Greek. And not only that - $\phi\iota\lambda o\sigma o\phi\iota\alpha$ defines the deepest and most essential feature of our West European history.

This is the *wording of an identity* and it is *indeterminate* because it is non-relative–in it the *other* of the West is *absent*.

59. The word $\phi\iota\lambda o\sigma o\phi\iota\alpha$ means 'love for wisdom' Is there love for wisdom or something similar outside of Greece? *I-Tching, the Upanishads,* Lao Tzu, Chuang Tzu, the Buddha, Patanjali, Nagarjuna, Shankara are available–how can we contend that they are out of the meaning of 'love for wisdom'?

For Heidegger the achievement is the question "What is?" Socrates asks: "What is beauty?" Socrates does not ask the question: "Is there such thing as *beauty at all*?." His restlessness is due to the dead-lock caused by a question such as 'What' and he does not accept a liberation such as the one Hippias offers: "the beautiful is the beautiful object." Socrates doesn't find 'the beautiful' and thus he does not confirm the meaning of his own question. This anxiety and anguish of "What is…' has proven to be inconsolable with the passing of time and with the continuation of philosophizing. Sciences that have 'originated from philosophy', from the question 'what is', do not address to this question but to relation and to relation-based description. Unlike Plato, Aristotle brings up questions both for the concrete and the general.

62. Indo-European *form of metaphysics*. Philosophy as rational questioning and investigating of substances is ethnical phenomenon, an artifact of Ancient Greece and Old India, created in both cultures around 600 BC. It completely expresses *native language(s)* and their grammars.

The topic of metaphysics is still the same: the absolute subject who contains all possible predicates and to whom all possible predicates are being attributed. All this takes place in the Indo-European linguistic space with its grammar, the root of which are the forms 'subject-object' and 'subject-predicative', connected via *copula* modus. That is why the main question of these philosophies is the *absolute subject* and its being. This is $o\upsilon\sigma\iota\alpha$ or *Brahma*.

63. *Love for wisdom–Greek cultural form.* The Greek word 'philosophy' and the philosophical behavior, described so picturesquely in Plato's dialogues, do not express an investigation but rather a language game–a game of questions and answers. In these dialogues *debate often dissolves into free conversation* ("Symposium') *or collapses into unsolvable question* ("Hippias Major"). In India we also find abundance of such debates.

73. Within the framework of *is–is not, being–non-being* it's easy to think-up premises from which under suitable definitions we could justify everything.

Being is, non-being is not.
Life is being, death is non-being.
Therefore life is, death is not.

We could hardly gain any calmness from this syllogism when it comes to questions of living and dying.

'Justifying' with words and concepts is illusion of the logos. We 'justify' basic phenomena such as colors by wavelengths. When physics asserts: "Light *is* electromagnetic radiation and colors *are* different lengths of electromagnetic waves", this crucial '*is*' is not taken from the world but thought-up by the thinking.

'Shift' of 'justification'. We change the places of justification and justified, of the wave theory of light and the phenomena of color. Now colors justify wavelengths. Indeed, the theory of colors as wavelengths is justified by the phenomena of color. These phenomena corroborate the theory and are being explained by it. But in this shift 'justification' is also lost, for it could be present only between components of a single system and *images* and *numbers* of wavelengths are not in a single system.

75. *Inflation of metaphysical systems.* Philosophical schemes (or 'systems') are unverifiable and thus boundlessly diverse. They are only loosely tied to one another. This is an obvious difference between them and the empirical scientific theories which change and build upon one another. This difference results from the *loss of experience:* the experience that brings life to sciences and the refusal of which takes life away from metaphysical systems.

77. It is not possible to comprehend the world a priori, before or independently of experience or via pure, disembodied mind. In this respect *philosophy is corrupted by language and in former truth is inseparable from delusion.*

Chapter 5. REALIZATION OF UNREALIZED FORMS

80. *Unconsciously 'bad' questions.* Questions about definitions, arguments, and proofs without reference to extra-linguistic phenomena have only conceptual significance. They do not pertain to determinate things in space and time. This also goes for analytic philosophy.

When we ask: "Is there a destiny or everything happens by chance?" there is no hope that we could get a definite answer that in the same time alludes to the world. It is the same when we ask: "Is there psyche or everything is physiology?"

The questions about 'characteristics', 'properties', attributes', 'substances', 'generalities', 'necessities', 'absolutes', 'being' and 'non-being' are meaningless if they are asked out of a purely theoretical scheme, if they are put to the world itself.

82. *Unawareness about the conditionality of questions.* When we are seized by the question, submerged in it, dependent on it, it is 'unconditional' for us. Only moving the mind away from the question makes us free to realize its conditionality which is crucial for its adequate formulation and thus–its answer. Even questions such as "Is there a sheet of white paper on this table?" and "Is the snow fresh?" are relative, as they are meaningless in certain cultures.

84. *Are there truly unsolvable questions?* Can the great questions become meaningful by analogy with the lesser ones?

85. *This world is 'such' only in relation to another.* The mysteries 'of the world' are not solvable from here. There is no way to experiment with the 'form of the world', with 'the world as a whole'. The world would not have been determinable as *this world* if there was *another* world for the former to be related to. There is no way for us to be in both worlds and to compare them.

86. *'Profoundness'?* Philosophy has always perceived itself as the greatest, most profound knowledge. But what does 'philosophical profoundness' or 'knowledge profoundness' mean?

Experiment. In the following order of statements, sorted by semblance, *which are more profound: the general ones* or *the particular ones*?

1. The being exists–the being does not exist.

1.1. Life is being–death is non-being.

1.1.1. All that lives disappears with its death.

1.1.1.1 I will disappear with my death.

There can't be answer to this question. And this means that neither the general nor the particular bear 'profoundness' unambiguously. The implications for philosophy are that it could turn out that it's not the most profound knowledge but rather the most superficial one.

88. *Decogitation.* Philosophical reason can't be annihilated with simple non-thinking, because non-thinking is not an adequate position in a thinking world. However, the philosophical mind can be prepared to clean and purge via appropriate philosophizing. The latter is an un-thinking philosophizing which has the task to bring out attitudes, habits, systematical errors and misconceptions that result in superfluous accumulation of words.

Chapter 6. MENTAL LIBERATION

91. *De-cogito and critique.* Critique takes place on textual level and decogitation occurs in the domains of mutual pervasion of thought-language-world. First and foremost, this means separation of concept-word from image, of perception from qualia.

Unthinking is not a critique. Critiques are exhausted as a philosophical enterprise. All critiques in the philosophy of theses and especially in the realm of European metaphysics are problem-free for all theses they attack are problematic. They are subject to deconstruction because they are constructed. They could be dissolved or simply ignored.

92. *The skepsis is a greater position.* "The skeptical ability ($\delta\acute{v}\nu\alpha\mu\iota\varsigma$) is what sets the occurrence ($\varphi\alpha\iota\nu\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu o\nu$) against the mental ($\nu oo\acute{v}\mu\epsilon\nu o\nu$) (phenomenon against noumenon); from here by virtue of equanimity ($\iota\sigma o\sigma\theta\epsilon\nu\epsilon\iota\alpha$) of opposite things and words we first arrive at refraining from judgments ($\acute{\epsilon}\pi o\chi\acute{\eta}$) and then at ($\acute{\alpha}\tau\alpha\rho\alpha\xi\acute{\iota}\alpha$). We call the 'perceptual' ($\alpha\acute{\iota}\sigma\theta\epsilon\tau\acute{\alpha}$) occurrence and thus we set it against the mental ($\nu o\eta\tau\acute{\alpha}$)." (Sextus Empiricus, *Outlines of Pyrrhonism*, I, [4] 8-9). And the refraining from judgment is called thus for we hold our thinking ($\delta\iota\alpha\nu o\iota\alpha$) in order not to affirm or negate anything as consequence of the equanimity of the investigation" (Ibid. I, [22] 196). Here an entire theory of skepsis is developed in ten old and five new tropes (paths, points).

For example: 'the very so called evidence can be either obvious or non-obvious to us; if it is non-obvious, then we'll not accept it with conviction; if it is obvious to us, then precisely because we are investigating the notions which are perceivable to living beings, we'll have to investigate it also, if it is correct, insofar as it is obvious to us' (Ibid. I, [14] 60).

93. One way or another, it seems that 'bad problems' are peculiar *language nodes*. They are formed by blending of words and objects, of meanings that get together and intertwine out of mind and out of control. The mind seeks to untwine those nodes but more often than not it entangles them even further, deceiving itself that it is solving real problems. Of course, linguistic problems could be meaningful when we *know them as linguistic* and solve them as semantic problems, i.e. when we seek and establish meanings.

Words are not primary and when they associate to describe new things, they entail other words. 'One' entails 'two'. 'Smaller entails 'bigger', 'chance' entails 'necessity', 'word' entails meaning. Meanings are like fields around words and they attract neighboring words via polarities.

When we don't find the opposite in the world we imagine it, we think it up. We think 'perfect' from 'non-perfect'. However, this misleads us to take the unreal as real.

95. 'Verbal-perceptive'. The moment of *speaking* for a purely *perceptive form* is a *borderline case* because we focus on a non-linguistic reality. This sensibilium is not a linguistic entity and because of that *it is not spoken* but *denoted*. Red is not 'red'; it is something that is

before the language. This sensibilium or quale is irreducible. Questions like "Why?" or "What is?" cannot be asked about it.

96. *Beyond 'perceptive-linguistic'.* 'Perceptive' is 'perceptive' as category only as opposed to 'linguistic'. Empiricism as philosophy is only meaningful as opposed to rationalism. In fact, *sensations and concepts unite and blend inconspicuously* in our brain and mind. Seeing is unseen and hearing is unheard.

"Experience' out of its relation with 'reason' is not recording of observations and formulations of facts but living without involvement with the virtual.

This is the reality without artifacts, without thought-up information. Chair ceases to be 'chair', hand ceases to be 'hand'. "What is?" fades away as unclear question.

99. *Relativity of 'sentence'.* Language does not reflect the world. 'Sentences' are not just 'true' or 'false' (*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*)–they are messages between communication participants, they are 'language games' (*Philosophical Investigations*). However, 'language games' and 'life forms' are not one and the same thing.

Wittgenstein does not undertake the adoption of *linguistic relativity*. Wittgenstein does not investigate the forms 'S–O' and 'S–e–P'. The adoption of special and general relativity between cultures, languages and ontologies is a task that contemporary philosophers didn't place on the real ⊢ scale.

100. *Non-relativity of living.* The 'proving' of certain theses as initially true is an optical illusion originating from logic and mathematics. *It is not possible to prove that something is life, that something is mind, that something is sensation or thought.* Without these pre-scientific entities, which we are ourselves (and not our transcendental Selves), there is no science and there are no scientific proofs.

101. *The world formed in reality and actuality.* Here is a simple premise, taken from the experience. The world is formed by forms and they are defined by (confined to) space-time. Forms are real and virtual. Real are those forms that *live* in the horizon of the *human form*. They are living forms or non-living forms in the world that we perceive. All real forms in our world are human. The world has human form. The human form is also temporary and local among other life forms. Every life form has birth, lives and dies, creates its own world and exists in it. Other life forms are present in the human world as recognizable through the optics of the human form forms of life.

Virtual are those forms that *do not live their own life*. They are local, transitory, human-manufactured. They are artifacts. They have no birth, they do not die. The virtual does not create world, does not exist in it insofar as it does not have birth, it does not live and it does not die. You cannot be born and you cannot die in a 'virtual world'.

Virtual forms transpierce real ones and the border between virtual and real is often invisible. However, an appropriate experiment could *reveal* and *detach real* from *virtual*. The real is present everywhere and always where and when there are civilizations, cultures, nations and tribes.

102. *Three levels of forms.* Virtual forms (signs) are differently distributed in their remoteness from the perceptive flux: world form–concrete concept–abstract concept.

'River' is a word for *world form* and the former does not form the river but puts it in the class of rivers–great water streams that pour into the sea. '*Chair'* is word for an *artifact*. Without its concept (function) a chair is not a chair. People of foreign culture might not recognize it as something designed for sitting. '*Conscience'* is word of another order, as is 'matter'. These

words form a mental stratum of the world whose objects are not directly found in the perceivable world.

103. *Archeology and anthropology of forms*. '*Archeology is not 'deconstruction'*. It is not supposed to dethrone and disprove classical thinking patterns *but rather to bring them out of the unconscious domain* and to perceive their form. Thus their relativity will be understood without blindly changing one type of structures for another. Anthropology compares local forms and determines their boundaries.

Thus the analysis is diachronic–'archeology' or synchronic–'cultural anthropology'– revealing artifacts and life forms in different temporal strata.

106. *Mental liberation–attitudes and operations*. 'De-cogito or thought freedom' is formulation of a *pre-attitude* which could be developed regarding speech and thinking along with the identities they create.

This predisposition includes modes such as: un-thinking, dis-claiming, dis-habituating, un-learning.

Removing words. If we remove 'God' from 'God exists' and replace it with another absolute subject, the meaning is preserved. Thus 'God' is not a category but rather a name in a category of 'absolute subjects'.

Castling. Exchanging the places of words and grammatical functions in an expression. This alteration reveals dependencies of meanings on basic word order. It leads to realization of unrealized forms. The exchange of places of subject and object outlines the reversibility or the irreversibility of 'subject–object'.

Shift. The shift allows for a language form to be *tested* via overturning. In the process it is determined if the language form is practically unavoidable and invariable. Thus a conditionality of a category can be ascertained, for example if we 'shift' from 'necessity' to 'fortuity'.

Reduction. Concepts take up space and make it inaccessible to other concepts thereby generating an illusion for uniqueness and 'essence'. Thus they block the way of an alternative understanding and hinder deeper pervasion (Ockham's Razor eliminates redundant entities).

Deconstruction. If expressions are units that result from grammatical programs and have the function to describe and explain, their dis-uniting shows the manner in which they were pieced together and how they operate.

Dissolving. 'Substances', 'essences' and 'things' can 'soften' and 'dissolve' into the background or into mutual relations, thereby showing themselves as virtual. One and the same perceptual phenomenon could be described with or without a certain 'thing' in it.

A final phase of dissolution might consists in seeing a *text* in one's native language as *a series of figures* or hearing *speech* in one's native language as *a stream of sounds*.

Relativization. Relations are recognized and links between concepts are tracked. The ways in which a concept is defined are shown and the networks in which it dissolves are revealed. There it loses its apparent independence. A concept void of the relations mentioned is drained off determinacy.

Distillation. Feeling (experience) is separated from concept, word, category, opposition. When we unthink a concept, what remains is perception or a bare heap of sensations.

These techniques are not Method and yet they are by no means weaker than 'the Method'.

II. 'COGITO', MIND, THINKING
Chapter 7. COGITO–ARCHEOLOGY

108. *The realm of pure phenomena–Husserl:* In *The Idea of Phenomenology (1907)* we find:

1. Transcendent reality, external to the mind and studied by natural sciences.

2. Immanent reality of psychic phenomena.

3. Transcendental reality of pure phenomena.

Correspondence between phenomena and certain external objects. 'The main epistemological problem' with this correspondence.

Absolute science that has to be created: *The transcendental phenomenology–*the ever sought and constantly re-found Science of sciences.

109. *Transcendental and immanent.* I forget that 'I perceive the glass' and that in this state the glass is an absolute phenomenon. And who is the Self who forgets? If this is Transcendental Self, we get 'I am aware of an immanent self who perceives the glass'. However, the second act does not differ from the first one.

If phenomenological attitude was absolute it would be unrelated to psychological attitude but then how does the transcendental Self relate to the empirical one?

110. *Intentionality (Intentionalität).* This is how Brentano defines intentionality: Every psychical phenomenon is characterized by what the Scholastics of the Middle Ages called the intentional (or sometimes the mental) inexistence of an object, and what we should like to call, although not quite unambiguously, the reference (*Beziehung*) to a content, the directedness (*Richtung*) toward an object (which in this context is not to be understood as something real) or the immanent-object quality (*immanente Gegenständlichkeit*). Each contains something as its object, though not each in the same manner. In the representation (*Vorstellung*) something is represented, in the judgment something is acknowledged or rejected, in desiring it is desired, etc. This intentional inexistence is peculiar alone to psychical phenomena. No physical phenomenon shows anything like it. And thus we can define psychical phenomena by saying that they are such phenomena as contain objects in themselves by way of intention (intentional). (*Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt I*, Buch II, Kapitel I § 5 (pp. 125 f.; English translation p. 88).)

If the realization of an object and the awareness of the realization of an object are taken as primary and secondary intention and intentional act, how can we reach the pure phenomenon from here? Paradoxically enough, we have to unthink the intention and only then the 'phenomenon' (i.e. the object) remains.

Besides, not every cogitation has its object. There are feelings, emotions, desires and experiences that are objectless. On the other hand, physical objects are by no means mutually unrelated.

111. *Rein Denken–Hegel.* It is not possible to 'think purely' in the sense of lack of mental content. If I empty my mind of any content, then I no longer think. And what could we think about 'a thought that thinks itself'? What does this thought contain? This leads to unthinking the 'pure thinking'.

112. *Ego cogito–Descartes.* "If, on the other hand, I had only ceased to think while everything else that I had imagined remained true, I would have had no reason to believe that I existed; therefore I realized that I was a substance whose essence, or nature, is nothing but thought, and which, in order to exist, needs no place to exist nor any other material thing. So this self, that is to say the soul, through which I am what I am, is entirely separate from the body, and is even more easily known than the latter, so that even if I did not have a body, my soul would continue to be all that it is" (René Descartes: *Discourse on Method* (1637) *Translated by Paul*

Brians.
http://www.wsu.edu:8080/~wldciv/world_civ_reader/world_civ_reader_2/descartes.html)

Here 'self' is identified with 'the soul which is completely different from the body'. Thus Descartes returns in the bosom of the Middle Ages metaphysics. Throughout the experience there is no such thing as soul without a body. 'Soul' without a body is non-relative and indeterminate. Thus the substantial dualism 'soul-body' is unthought-of.

113. *Cogito –λογοζ. λογοζ* is the root of thinking. With this extraordinary word: 'λογοζ (word)' Heraclitus, Plato and Aristotle qualify *the form, the order* in *speaking, writing, thinking, and in the world itself.*

Cogito becomes *scientia* and *λογοζ* becomes *ἐπιστήμη*. We simply think concepts and write down 'sciences'. All these sciences justify themselves by pointing to philosophy.

Both *cogito* and *λογοζ* lack *awareness of the relativity* of everything said and thought.

Thinking–speech refers from Descartes to Augustine in its origin and then to St. John's *Gospel* (Christ's word) and to Moses' *Being*. Thus the root pervades deeper than the Greek antiquity–it reaches the Jewish Tora.

115. *Cross-cultural comparison.* Ibn Sina, Avicenna (980–1037) experiments with a man who soars in the sky with band before his eyes. "He *speculates* and asks himself if his existence is proven. *Without a bit doubt he would declare that he exists*" (Phillipe, 1975: 1–9, italics mine).

Avicenna speculates beyond the Self unlike Descartes. However, he also affirms that existence is indubitable to thinking. Therefore *ego* is not a necessary pole of *cogito*, yet cogito is necessary in order to prove being. We must not forget that Avicenna is influenced by Aristotle.

116. *"Si fallor, sum"–Augustine.* Cogito is to a great extent inherited from the scholastic vocabulary and is semantically and logically deduced from Plato and Aristotle–'*the Philosopher'.*

The logos as attitude affirms existence *through thought and speech*. However, even before I say or think of anything, I look, breathe, feel my body. The same attitude affirms the subject through the existence of the predicate. The predicate however does not imply existence but rather relation to the subject–predicate-and-subject could be non-existent, for example, 'a winged horse', and still, since the latter has wings he still *is*, at least as thinkable object.

These paradoxes originate from Aristotle's treatment of the existent as directed to the subject–predicate form and the substantialization of the subject. As for the existential question about my own existence, *it is solved most clearly prior to language and prior to asking–in the pre-predicative and pre-linguistic presence of living. This solution is completely beyond cogito and logos.*

117. The mind–Aristotle. After Anaxagoras, Aristotle accepts *νουζ* into the soul as independent substance, instance. This nous is the thinking, the thought capability. It turns out that the ancient mind ('*nous*') of Anaxagoras is proto-image of Christian and modern cogito (in German philosophy: spirit, reason).

118. The absence of pure ideas in the real word prompts Plato to relate them to another, ideal world. What is the statute of the ideal world? The description of 'the ideal state' consists of tens of thousands of sentences that refer to a thought up, yet clearly imaginable state. *There is no mental content unless it is thought-up.*

Just as the mind sees (or the brain processes images), in the same way the mind thinks (the brain processes concepts). In this world there are no thinking spirits without body and seeing bodies without spirit. In this world there is no abstract thought, independent of any images

whatsoever. We can't think something that is unimaginable as a phenomenon. We can't breathe mental air, eat metal food and live thought up life.

120. *Non-thinking (Patanjali)*. Instead of 'I think–I exist' there are other possible and even opposite views. Its *cross-cultural analogue* in the Vedic tradition is *citta*. In the Indian yoga practice and philosophy mind (*citta*) is liberated and cleansed (*Samadhi*) when it ceases to think.

Instead of 'Self' we find three 'things': 'citta'–mind, vrtti–modifications of mind and behavior and then 'drastuh'–seer in ''svarūpa'–his own form. Thus the 'Self' turns out to be non-universal category. Thinking is fluctuation, modification, motion, impurity, non-freedom.

Cogito purges ego to pure thinking and citta attains purity of 'drastuh' via non-thinking.

121. *Unthinking the 'Ego cogito' structure*. Let us continue doubting on an even deeper level and see if we are on firm ground. We are not because the doubt remains: do we not think-up the *I-think* form by virtue of the momentum of the linguistic form? For where is this Self and where I think separately of it? Is it not the *silent speech:* 'Je pense', 'Ego cogito' the one that Descartes has in mind? If we want to be sure that we stand in the clear we should unthink both the silent French and the silent Latin phrase and to seek out the unconditional absolute and therefore non-French and non-Latin thought. Yet since it is dependent on native language, we should dis-claim it. Thus *the structure 'I-think' falls away*.

Left on itself, cogito dissolves into indeterminacy as it is indiscernible from everything else.

Why should the case be that where there is thinking there must be also thinking self? Why should an agent be assumed wherever there is a process? Who rains rain? Every determinacy is dissolved in the non-relative subject. Mediation doubts 'I think' because no self separated from the thoughts could be found in the thoughts, just as I can't separate the hearer from the hearing, can I?

122. *Ego cogito–grammar*. 'Ego cogito' as a sentence is a synthesis of subject and predicative, noun and verb.

Reduction. Let us compare the extended expression 'I think thought' with the reduced one 'I think'. Do these two thought differ from one another? Here it is clear that the 'transcendental apperception' 'I think' (Fichte) does not possess the obviousness that is often attributed to it. In actuality we think, than we think that we think and then we think that we think that we think until we sink into indeterminacy. Where is the 'transcendental Self'?

Grammatical form. Is it not possible that the whole 'thinking of thinking' situation is but a grammatical snare? For the silent 'I think' that *we do not pronounce in our heads* dissolves completely–it is nothing more than 'a pure mind' and *non-relatively it is no longer even a mind*.

In the centuries-long classical treatment of this central metaphysical topic *the structure subject–predicate in the interplay of thinking and language remains unexplored*. 'I think' presupposes the structure 'subject–predicate' together with the presupposition of the 'subject–object' structure–two fundamental structures of Indo-European grammars yet not of 'language in general'.

123. *Who thinks in Ego cogito?* 'I think' is 'something that thinks' (Descartes).Does the Self think, or an impersonal mind? In the first case we speak about Western category as 'the Self' in the sense of substantial personality, subject or transcendental Ego is not a form peculiar to non-western cultures. In the second case we speak about a universal form or formlessness but is this 'Self'?

Is there a thinking Self? Which is the Self that thinks? Rene Descartes? Undoubtedly the answer is 'no' as otherwise that would be personal thought associated with a biography; and

even if the name of the person was different, the though could have been the same. Perhaps this Self is the one who speaks the language in which the phrase is articulated? And is it the writing Self the one who realizes that one could not doubt if one is gone?

Dissolving. If we try to distillate a pure phenomenon at that point, we won't find anything definite. Out of the thought-phrase, thinker and thought content cannot be separated. Taken non-relatively, *thinking dissolves into indeterminacy.*

Indeterminacy. Taken by itself, without the doubtful and already un-thought thoughts, the process of *cogitation* disappears. For what kind of *thinking* could there be if there is *nothing* to think about? If thoughts are doubtful, then thinking them is also doubtful. If thoughts are realized as doubtful, precisely this awareness is doubt. But what kind of doubt is doubt without the thoughts, *about which* we doubt?

A clear and mute thinking is not *definable* as 'thinking'. Thus *cogito is not only non-unquestionable but also disappears, dissolves into indeterminacy.*

125. *Versions of Ego–cogito–esse.*
"I think, therefore I exist";
"I think, therefore do not I exist";
"I do not think, therefore I exist";
"I do not think, therefore I do not exist."

Of our possible statements of direct deduction from thinking to existence *not a single one is necessarily true* and *not a single one is necessarily false.* Their *relation* to other premises (hidden, presupposed) *alters them radically* and *transfers them into completely different philosophical traditions and systems* where the statements in question attain relative trueness or falseness, depending on the experience and its corresponding postulates within the framework of these systems.

The same goes for these inverted statements:
"I exist, therefore I think";
"I exist, therefore I do not think";
"I do not exist, therefore I think";
"I do not exist, therefore I do not think."

Deconstruction. If I think the Self as *united with the thinking*, then it could also be *dis-united*.

Thinking and existence could be non-constant, could be fluent and thus 'existence–non-existence' could imply 'thinking–non-thinking'.

Thereby the brilliant phrase that has become the sign of the New European philosophy is by no means 'an obvious truth', not unlike *any other phrase.*

126. *Descartes unthinks the non-mental.* What is unthought in the Cartesian meditations is the world, phenomena, things, events–everything non-mental. Doubt is mental and as such cannot be related to non-mental occurrences. Meditation requires *focusing on the difference between linguistic expression and process*, which is not the case with Descartes–there language and reality are contaminated. Eventually, *instead of completing an all-out un-thinking, Descartes substantializes the thinking process.* The result is just the opposite of what meditation strives to accomplish, namely: infinite thinking.

In the run of his radical doubt Descartes (and Husserl after him) 'denies' authentic existence of the phenomenal world. He dissolves the perceptual world of the body and leaves thinking and the Self intact. This is noted immediately by his critics.

One cannot doubt not about the thinking but on the contrary–about the body and the world. *One cannot unthink something that is not mental*.

129. *We think in the stream of embodied living.* Position according to which thinking is separate from perception and imagination is a naïve one. Thinking is an aspect of living with concepts, images, sensations, words; it results from their interrelated flux. Separation of thinking occurs via language as mental speech. This, however, is provisional as thinking takes place also via images. When words are arranged in a stream of comprehension we say that we think. To separate 'thinking' along with 'being' and moreover as 'the being' is nothing less than a pure speculation, conducted by the metaphysics of the Christian West.

Chapter 8. 'MIND'

130. *We could do without the 'mental'–Rorty.* Richard Rorty's endeavor to dismantle the *mind–body* dichotomy in *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Rorty, 1998, p. 83–103). The experiment with the 'antipodians', who do not find 'psyche' in themselves, shows that in an important sense the dilemma in question is thought-up.

The conclusion reached in the process of unthinking is that 'non-linguistical' cannot be verified linguistically. Statements about entities do not count as evidence. Entities such as life, psyche, and intellect are not subject to proving. Only assertions in formal systems can be proved; only experience can count as evidence.

131. *Phenomena no not have grammar.*

"My tooth hurts. I have toothache." This variability of expression implies phenomenal indivisibility of 'tooth' and 'ache'. We can't find pain separated from the painful object prior to language. It is impossible for us to say "Your tooth hurts me" though. This impossibility indicated something for the 'self' or for 'my body'.

The tooth *is only in one body* and this body is what hurts. Is the tooth just a 'thing' and is the pain just a 'process'? We could forget the Self but the toothache would surely remain. What remains is the body 'in which there is a toothache' as a *felt toothache.* Toothache is *an experience* and not message from another person. The need of 'subjective' and of 'Self' falls away, not unlike the difference between tooth and pain. This is how it turns out that the toothache phenomenon does not have the form 'My tooth hurts'.

132. *The mind (νουζ) according to Aristotle.* "Within the soul the faculties of knowledge and sensation are potentially these objects, the one what is knowable, the other what is sensible. They must be either the things themselves or their forms. The former alternative is of course impossible: it is not the stone which is present in the soul but its form.

It follows that the soul is analogous to the hand; for as the hand is a tool of tools, so the mind is the form of forms and sense the form of sensible things" (*On the Soul*, III 8).

133. '*Pure mind' in the Buddhism.* The Chinese Chan-master Huang-Bo (?-850) defines pure mind (心, hsin) by negation: "All Buddhas and all living beings are nothing but someone's mind. Of uninitial time itself this Mind never arises and never ceases to be. It is not blue and it is not yellow. It has neither appearance nor form."

134. *The mind has no form.* Mental life could simply be called 'mind' and further definition-freely described as 'intellect', 'understanding', 'reason'. Deprived of thought, the mind is formless: the mind in which there is no 'thinking' is to some extent to ascribable to the Greek νουζ and the Sanskrit *chitta but also to the Chinese* 心. This non-thinking 'mind' is not a

'subject' in grammatical or logical sense because it is beyond all names. Also, it is not a 'mind' if taken unconditionally and non-relatively.

135. *Pure mind is mind without thought. It has no object.* For an external perceiver the mind is unperceivable 'in the person' when there is no perceived body.

137. *Orientation is bodily–spatial.* The intentionality of the mind is not organized along the lines of *internal–external*. The mind cannot be directed 'outwards', i.e. towards an object as the latter is not spatial and hence couldn't possibly be 'inside'. Only the *body*, the sense can be directed outwards. When the mind sees a cloud in the sky it is not directed outwards but is *identical* with the keen attention in which the cloud is revealed.

138. *'Intentionality' is grammatical.* "In the notion (*Vorstellung*) something is presented, in the judgment something is affirmed or negated, in the desire something is desired, etc." (Brentano). This formulation is pure grammatical structure, tautological in a sense: *"in desire something is desired"*, "I desire the desired".

The directedness towards an object is not necessary. Often we imagine *something unclear*, affirm *something indeterminate, we don't know* what we want, etc. If we think the form *noesis–noema* clearly and maintain that we have notion only as far as we imagine *something* and that we experience pain only as far as *something* is hurting us, then *in what does the act of imagining differ from the image and in what–the act of experiencing pain from the painful thing?* For toothache is *process* and *thing* in the same time. If there is no phenomenal difference, then the distinction is matter of concepts, words, and of grammatical form.

Pain is not structured via mind–body. 'Mind–body' is a description.

141. *'Experiencing' is empty concept.* If everything is nothing but experiencing, what does 'experiencing' mean? If there is no reality beyond the experience, the latter is indeterminate and its concept is impossible. We are trapped in the snare of non-relativity. The word 'world' is comparable to the non-relative word 'experiencing'–and the first is non-relative too. Let us then identify experiencing with world for the moment–we 'world', i.e. there is 'worlding'.

If there is only one 'experiencing', then why we do not experience what the others do? You cannot see my colors in my mind ('privileged access'). My answer is: just as I do not see the colors in your mind, in the same way I do not pump out your blood with my heart. The gap between mentalities does not imply transcendental self but *individuality*.

'Soul' is a conditional concept of 'experiencing', not unlike the very concept of 'experiencing'. Furthermore, the characteristics 'spiritual' and 'bodily' are nowhere to be found except in words.

143. I see color. Where is the seeing and where is the color? I only find color 'in front of myself' and in a different perspective, 'the other person stands with their own eyes in front of a color'. The same gap forms: the color is 'in me', and in the 'other person' we see understand the process of seeing as radiation–eye–optical nerve–brain. Thus in the stream of 'worlding' a color perception is formed and in the perspective of a perceived body a process of information treatment is conceived of. The gap disappears. If I was able to see someone else's color, I wouldn't be an individual. If I saw the world through other people's eyes, separate individualities would not exist.

144. There is no definite discrimination, no mutual position, no opposition: 'mind–world'. 'Mind' is not isolated from 'world' but neither is identical with it.

146. *There is 'form' of our own life.* It is immediately experienced and lived.

This form, although expressed effectively in different manners via natural language, is neither 'subject–object', neither any other structure whatsoever. Let us call this form 'form of

life'. Of course, there is no real form-of-life here; this is only an expression that replaces fixed structures such as 'mind–body' and 'mind–world'. When I look at the rose the dimension rose–eye–brain disappears. What remains is the rose as a life process–'form of life'.

Chapter 9. COMPREHENDING AND THINKING

149. *Comprehending is a pure mental act.* It is independent from sciences, philosophies and even from the cultures. *The knowledge of what is real in the stream of world-life is not proved and cannot possibly be proved.* It even should not be formed in concepts as to avoid including it in theories.

150. Comprehending means to grasp something with your mind without necessarily to name it. That is to probe deeply in it as a worldly form. Thereby we bring order to disorder using a form.

151. The question 'how' can replace the questions 'what' and 'why'. 'How' pertains to the logical-linguistic-worldly *form*, and 'what'–to objects–substances.

152. 'Something' shrinks, comes into focus, its form is perceived.

The chess player does not associate concepts; rather, he comprehends the position on the board and determines the next move by separating it from a great many possible moves. He reduces the improbability of the move from a great number to zero. This *is not thinking via concepts;* this is thinking in positions and steps in order to prevent checkmate and to inflict checkmate.

154. The same goes for skiing, driving and for any other bodily skill. Thus *learning is shortening (organizing), memorizing, automating.* This could be also expressed as comprehension. Learning is mastering by the mind.

155. 'Thinking as such' is fiction. The definitions of 'thinking' bear witness to this statement. All of them contain symmetry and mutual dependency: 'mind–thinking, understanding–judgment, reason–comprehension, ability–performance'. The difference between the mind as something and thinking as the mind's motion is grammatical to the same extent as the difference between the tooth and the toothache. Thinking escapes definition just as any other thing whose 'essence' is being sought for.

And yet thinking is as clear and obvious to anybody, just as seeing and hearing. And just like seeing and hearing thinking in its own frequency is indeterminable from the outside while it is known from the inside in the recognition of one's own thinking. *Everyone knows what thinking is by virtue of their own experience.* The only person that doesn't know is the one that doesn't think. Do you think that thinking could be explained to him?

156. *Thinking is a life process.*

161. *Mental division does not meet its correspondence in the world.* The world can be divided arbitrarily. There is no fundamental or obvious division. The world is divided differently in different cultures. The oldest division is perhaps the Chinese pair 'yin'   and 'yang'   .

Divisions are culturally meaningful but if we try to carry them out thoroughly unsolvable problems arise.

'Mental' and' bodily' are considered in an immensely wide context throughout the cultures that speak subjective language. A psychological illness is both mental and bodily one. Yet the illnesses of the body are 'psychogenic'. It is not true that mind and body are two different things but it is also not true that they are one and the same thing. What kind of metaphysics could describe such a relation? Mental functions–attention, memory, intellect–regenerate and develop along with the regeneration and the development of the body. There is no

mental energy separate from the bodily one and there is no mental life process separated from the bodily life process.

Thinking in 'pure concepts', 'pure divisions' as in Kant, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, is a multi-flow thinking up. The paths of these thinkers are not one and the same; a consistent thinking cannot combine them. We have to choose only one of them. Which one–no one can say.

164. *Rational thinking without concepts*. Concepts are used only in thinking-with-speech or in writing; only in thinking-with-words.

Dancing, climbing, skiing, chess playing and many more activities and games, which are not determined fully by their rules and constantly require synthesizing a solution, *are managed mentally but without concepts*. Spontaneous activities do not require conceptual thinking and in these domains thinking is free to focus on tense points and to create forms. *Concepts of the unique rational moves* in a rational activity are not possible.

Sometimes precisely the lack of concept of the way to accomplish something provokes rational action, i.e. certain act is synthesized.

Therefore rational thinking is not thinking with concepts but *dynamical comprehension* of situations.

165. *Thoughts are not 'deduced' but synthesized*. New thoughts are not created by logical entailment nor are they taken from sensory data.

From one and the same premises and by the same sensations different people reach different thoughts. Even one and the same person reaches different thoughts from identical premises and sensations in different moments.

166. *From what are thoughts made of?* What is their substance, their material? They are changes of *mind*, of consciousness. They are images, forms, co-relation or mental speech. Yet they are things in the world.

Thoughts associate in unforeseeable ways but follow the form of signs or of qualia. Different types of grammar induce different types of thinking. We think in a different manner when we think in pictures compared to when we think chess pieces, for example. 'Forms of thought' resemble Wittgenstein's 'language games'.

168. *Thinking builds and draws*. Just like poetry and rhythm in music, so thoughts in their linkwork and architectonics lead to other thoughts. Unnoticeably the process of thinking-up is being pervaded by words and concepts which come to dominate over perception and world.

169. *Thinking does not create knowledge without perception*. We cannot think up what is there in the refrigerator before we open its door. We cannot come to know from where we originate and where are we going to, what are life and death and etc. only by means of mental and verbal efforts.

170. '*Apriority' is relative*. Grammatical forms precede experience in a relative sense but after all they are created in order to experience into words.

171. *There is no way for us to think up the way the world is*. Nothing about the world is available to the kind of thinking without perception. For perception is not thought-less and thinking is not super-perceptive.

Chapter 10. THINKING IN THE FORM OF LIFE

172. '*Ego cogito'–worldly process*. The stream of thought has the form of Ego, *Ego cogito*, yet not of transcendental but rather of empirical ego–a human being in a human culture.

Spontaneous thought waves are Ego-waves. Their flow is uninterrupted by the mind's regulation. After them emotional states follow. They overflow and overspill from object to object and from topic to topic.

173. *Entropy of thought.* Thinking emerges from a mental chaos of thoughts and then submerges in it. This goes for any life process–life wrenches itself out of chaos and then sinks into chaos.

It is convenient to use the schemes like 'potential–flux' to understand that the engine of the mental process is 'psychical potential', the tension of *the problem*, the emotional tension. The thought about 'engine' of 'the movable' is grammatically formed in the schemes 'subject–predicate (-ive)' and 'verb–noun'.

174. *De-ego-cogito.* Freedom *is* to turn the mental flux on and off. This means to avoid prejudice, belief, strife, criticizing. In this sense we speak about thinking with pure mind. It is a powerful, cognitive thinking that comprehends things rather than burying them under prejudices. Thinking without Ego means to think with pure mind and its then when the world is comprehended more clearly.

De-ego-vization reveals the Ego-patterns–repeating mental models, durable neuronal networks. Then adequate actions could be preformed instead of habitual ones. If we free thinking from the fervor of the mental flux, then large thought massifs will fall away.

175. Where thinking has hypostasized itself as Cogito, as a central conception, in which pure thinking is the substance, the essence, the definition of man and science, there De-cogito is necessary.

In the '*de-cogito*' attitude, concepts are thought as *relative, fortuitous and local instead of absolute, necessary and universal.*

176. *Dissolution of thinking.* A rose is truly experienced in de-cogito. I see the rose, I smell the rose and in this I do not distinguish and I should not distinguish between the rose in itself, the rose for the briar, and the rose for the Self.

Dissolution all definitions and eventually the very word 'rose' returns the rose to us. This is how cogitation comes to be de-cogitation and pure thinking is dissolved. Dissolved in what? In the world itself.

177. '*Profoundness' is a metaphor.* Which is more profound? The general or the particular? The universal or the unique? The 'profoundness' in question can be found on the surface and consists of arrangement of what there is, of definiteness.

179. *Thought does not reflect an independent world.* In the usual for West mental attitudes language expresses thought and the two of them go together. *Thought expresses the world,* language expresses *thought*. Thereby the world is thought of as an objective world, independent of us.

180. *Thinking follows the re-synthesis of life.* Planning of an action is mental visualization of possible actions based on possible circumstances.

181. *Thinking in written form disguises life.* Written words bring about contamination of real and virtual.

Writing is present in a few nations. Almost all ancient scripts were used for state and economic statistics, accounting and administrative orders. They reflected an entire social order. In a more recent stage registration of systematical knowledge and fabrication of concepts were developed. The world is registered as similar to the social order: 'act of creation', 'god–lord', 'laws', 'laws of Nature'.

183. *Even 'Time' is thought up.* We represent temporal concepts as correlated with 'objective time'. We speak and think about 'five minutes', 'ten days', 'one year' just as we speak about 'five apples', 'ten meters', 'one turn of the Earth around the Sun'. This is realized in the process of cross-cultural comparison (Whorf). However, in actuality we never find ten days together or one year time before our eyes in the world.

Our natural temporal concepts, words and expressions are communicative and situative.

184. Thinking is rational *not* because it is *initiated by reason* but because it controls intentionally via communication the arrangement of things and processes, of actions, means and aims.

186. *Order and 'reason' are reduced to the form of re-synthesis of life.* Moreover, order is limited, local and pregnant with indeterminatess as soon as it leaves the artificially defined context of its usage.

Something is in order only from the perspective of local re-synthesis of a life form; order is relative to the life form. Order is unique, as it is conditioned by the situation. Indeterminacy is 'localized' as soon as we try to determine anything.

187. *Natural forms are not determinate 'things'.* Even a natural phenomenon is indeterminate, for example a mountain or a river. There are small uplands and small water streams that are probably not mountains and rivers. Where are the boundaries between a hill and a mountain and between a brook and a river?

The indeterminacy of the world is also indeterminacy of language in relation to the world (Quine: 'indetermination of the reference'). The words 'mountain' and 'river', 'scraper' and 'kibbler' become indeterminate. Here we face blurred *spectrum* of references.

188. Thinking fades into chaos and rises into order. When rational thinking fails, it dissociates into spontaneous a-rational thinking.

189. *Thinking falls away in the domain of the acquired.* Thinking spontaneously relieves itself from tensions. When a concept is thoroughly mastered it is applied unconsciously. Thereby the active concepts in the minds of professionals in the domains of mathematics, logic and science fall away.

190. Mental attitudes forms 'concealed premises' or 'prejudices'. These are the origin of all proofs. Innate ideas, deductive method, essences and all other principles of the New Age philosophy count among the prejudices in question.

191. *'Reasoning' is a cogito-fiction.* 'Cogito' differentiates itself as a stand-alone activity independent of action. Thinking 'pull itself' from the social life process and differentiates itself as quest 'for the truth'. Then the topic of *reason ("founding')* emerges. It is no chance that in the dawn of the New Age Leibniz's principle of the *sufficient reason* is legalized in logic. The enormous stream of Western knowledge is imbued with this project. The latter is also fully topical in the sciences.

193. *There is no right Method.* The best 'method'–non-method (the Chinese wu-wei 无

焉 is the following of a 'spontaneous line' (Tao 道) with minimum action with maximum accuracy. This means minimum energy expense and thus minimum entropy.

196. *Concepts are spontaneously taken for essences.* Every statement we make inevitably aims at determining something. Thinking identifies determinate things and is spontaneously inclined towards their hypostasizing as essences.

197. *A human thinks in a human form, not in the form of an independent world.* A human thinks and perceives in a human form. Thus perception, ideas, imagination, and thinking have identical form.

198. *We are able to think up things from forms in the real world.* 'Thinking' is a living process of the mind and is separated from the living process of the body. Thinking reaches far on the wings of imagination. Indeed, we are able to think objects that are unavailable in the world but we always think them in a worldly form.

200. *Thinking is alive when it produces meaning.* Meaning is attained when the life form in its process of re-synthesizing is achieved. To understand is to comprehend something in its human human-related meaning. And life meaning is the very experience as related to the expression.

202. *The world is covered by native description.* The world described has interpretative status in the people's community life. Thus the world has the form of a 'culture'. However, hermeneuticians and humanitarians deceive themselves when they think that the world *is* interpretation and culture.

Chapter 11. THE CONCEPT

209. *The concept is a creation, an artifact.* Concepts do not exist as ideal objective forms nor do they live life of their own. They are tools of designation which represent phenomenal forms. By using concepts we *define* and thus we 'envelop' indefinitely many objects.

210. Concepts are not separated distinctively in a detached 'species' as the different sense modalities are. Traditionally concepts are placed after ideas as rational forms of cognition.

211. Thought considers experience and arranges sensations and thus interprets them as schemes. However, thinking cannot replace perception. *We cannot think up the content of our experience.*

An out-of-focus photo cannot be digitally fixed. Indeterminate experience cannot be compensated by means of thinking and thus the former becomes a construction.

212. *Concepts are names for groups of forms.* Here we replace the Aristotelian understanding of definition as placing a species under a genus. The groups of forms are of a different type, similar to Wittgenstein's '*families*'.

Phenomenal indeterminacy of concepts. Where does the borderline between 'table' and 'non-table' lie? There is no such border unless we define it and thereby create it. In the world there is no such thing as the thing in itself, an essence that is 'the table as such'; for we can use as table many objects which moreover could be indeterminable.

What kind of glass is on the table? The 'thought of' glass or the 'looked at' glass? *This is not determinate* in the sentence. In the sentence there is no difference *between concept and perception.* That is why this difference is not realized, that is why account for its existence is not kept, and that is why attempts for its localization are not made.

Conceptual indeterminacy. There is no rigid determinacy of illness or health. There is no rigid determinacy of norm and pathology. There is no rigid determinacy of species genome. There is no rigid determinacy of animate in relation to inanimate.

The concept 'human' is name of all human beings, this 'all' being indeterminate. Not a single object in the world matches the definition 'human' or 'human nature'. The genotypes of any two random individuals do not coincide.

213. 'Pure phenomena', 'pure sensations' as well as 'pure thinking' are not available, yet there is difference between *seen* and *thought of*.

216. *Conceptual networks are programs for description of experience*. Conceptual systems are being applied not unlike software–as programs for interpretation of sensory experience.

Concepts and their networks are *determinate and fixed* and reality is *indeterminate* and *in constant flux;* thus *concepts and proofs come to be invalid.*

217. *Concepts are obsolete outside of describing and explaining.* An affirmed concept without an alternative to it becomes parasite. This parasite concept hinders the creation of adequate concept and becomes burden to thought. It is just like non-functional rudimentary organ in a living body that does not work but requires maintenance nevertheless.

219. The very word 'concept' means 'clarification'. But clarity precedes concept as element of sensory perception. In the latter clarity is very peculiar–it is *enigmatic*. Why there is no red color although the bat perceives the same wave? Now, if we directly ask: "Why there is red color?" we ask a stupid question. "Because thus!" is the only possible answer to it.

221. *The concept does not guarantee rationality.* Knowing the grammar is not tantamount to speaking a language. Knowing the rules of chess play is not equivalent to skill in chess play.

223. *Concepts are relative*. Empirical concepts are related to the world of sensation. And yet, in conceptual schemes, they are conditional and mutually dependent.

224. *Concepts are prone to variation*. One and the same 'thing', a local worldly form, could be expressed in different conceptual networks. When a worldly form is powerfully grasped it is expressible in many different concepts and regularities. Such is the case with the *Universal Law of Attraction.* Its formulations are many (Feynman).

231. *Categorial networks are relative*. One and the same thing, one and the same situation could be described via different categories, with different categorial schemes and systems. It's a fact that Aristotle's, Kant's, and Hegel's categories are completely different even though all of them pretend to be absolute.

Experiment. Thinking phenomena via 'possibility–reality' can be replaced with thinking via 'cause–conditions–action' or 'chance–necessity–reality' or numerically via 'probability from 0 to 100%'.

232. *General concepts are not always more profound.* Science has often exposed philosophical categories as superficial.

Einstein determines the relativity of the spatial-temporal concepts from the inertial system. This contradicts Kant's concepts as space and time as 'a priori forms of perception'.

Kant's categories 'divisibility–indivisibility' ('interuptedness–uninteruptedness'), which European philosophers treat as obvious, turn out to be meaningless in quantum mechanics–in quantum structures and interactions there is neither divisibility nor indivisibility.

The same goes for the classical concept of 'causality'. It loses its significance as a 'category' and especially as 'a priori category' since it is invalid in quantum interactions. More crucial categories of the European metaphysics fail in this aspect, including 'being–non-being' as quantum objects do not exist beyond the act of their ascertainment (measuring). However, in this act they are no longer micro objects but rather macro elements of experimental designs–spots on a photographic plate, sounds of a counter, lines in Wilson's chamber or on the display of a nuclear accelerator.

It is not possible to attribute either existence or non-existence to quantum phenomena.

This is how it turns out that philosophical concepts (categories) are more superficial rather than more profound.

233. *The most general concepts are in the same time the most local ones.* There is but another paradox of philosophical concepts. Instead of universal, they are local.

Categories *are unique to a certain culture.* The categories of Chinese thinking and language are fundamentally different from seemingly universal categories such as necessity–chance, possibility–reality, existence–non-existence, being–non-being. This shows that categories are artifacts, names and concepts.

Categories are thought of as something self-evident, obvious and thus–as universal, common to all mankind. This is *an optical illusion* generated by *the lack of awareness about relativity.*

III. *SPECULATIVE THINKING*
Chapter 12. THINKING WITHOUT WORLD

In the speculative concept *the bodily human being is not situated in a life process.* A human being has only the world in which it lives. In this aspect speculative thinking is thinking without world. Differentiating of 'thinking ' as 'speculative thinking' separates thinking-with language from thinking via images, from the living series of ideas, from the imagination.

236. *Relativity of 'in itself' and 'for itself'.* The pair 'in sich–für sich' is a veritable *gene* of Hegelian speculation. These moments are fundamental form of every Hegelian unfolding of 'pure thoughts', of definitions of 'pure concepts' and of categories. According to Hegel this type of thinking is absolute and it brings about Absolute Truth and Absolute Science. This is a great mistake. In actuality *all of Hegel's concepts are relative.*

Relativity is the origin of dialectics. The thing in Hegel is 'in itself', 'for itself', 'for the other', 'for us'. Without 'in itself' things cannot be thought of 'for us'.

Speculative concepts are impossible without phenomenal 'sense'. Even the most abstract of concepts such as 'in' and 'for' entail spatial sensations. Sense is significant to an even greater extent for the more concrete concepts in *the Phenomenology* and *the Logic.*

237. *Hegel's 'necessary becoming of concepts' is fortuitous.* Hegel declares that the unfolding of his thoughts and definitions is *necessary* and this is an intention crucial for the absolute revealing of consciousness. Let us analyze how it is that we 'necessarily' reach 'truth' and 'essence'. 'Necessary' means that there is no other veracious option available.

Experiment. In *Phenomenology of the Spirit*, part I, introduction, Hegel dialectically develops the experience of the mind with an object. Here the concepts 'truth' and 'essence' emerge: 'thus then this is the being of this 'in itself' for the consciousness, the true, which would however mean that it is the essence or the object of consciousness' (Hegel 1966, p. 84). Why instead of 'truth' and 'essence' one should not use *illusion* and *phenomenon*? Within the framework of the same relativizing logic, can't we say with the same 'necessity': 'thus then this is the being of this 'in itself' for the consciousness, the *illusionary*, which would however mean that it is the *phenomenon* or the object of the consciousness'. In this way the statement is logically sound too. Therefore, this is not a matter of necessity but one of construction of concepts.

241. Speculative thinking proclaims itself the most genuine and the core of science but it lacks independent examination. This is also characteristic of contemporary thinking, even in the field of physics (virtual particles and string theory). Descartes does the same before Hegel. 'There is science and no-science. Philosophy is not yet science, only yet I will make it into one'. Therefore, something else is science. For instance, geometry is a science. But how is that science is already there without the concept of science and the Science itself that philosophy is yet to

bring to the world? How does the philosopher know that a science is true before any science at all is available?

243. '*The speculative is meaningless'–Locke.* The speculative has negative sense which is expressed in *British empiricism* and in analytical philosophy, yet is ignored by German and French philosophers.

246. Ignoring metaphysics is evidently not sufficient in a metaphysics-friendly environment. We will climb down the ladder of thinking in the opposite direction to the speculative tradition, focused on the metaphysics which according to Hegel solely has 'the absolute form of the thinking' (Hegel). It is time for us to attempt, by using free thinking, to move through the strata of metaphysics downwards where perhaps there is an end to the ladder.

247. Today a *global vision* of European speculative thinking and concept construction is necessary. The new sphere that is yet to be investigated regarding concepts in philosophy is their *cultural anthropology* or *local form* and its place in the global diversity and unity of mental forms.

248. *Speculative thinking is local, ethnical.* It's a fact that speculative thinking is not global–it is not developed in all of the advanced civilizations. This also shows that speculative thinking is *not universal*. The speculative is ethnically specific, closely connected with the mentality of Indo-European cultures.

These traditions are developed within *the framework of Indo-European language family.* This fact is *beyond the scope of our philosophy*.

Chapter 13. SPECULATIVE CONCEPTS

250. '*Speculative' and 'empirical' are indefinable a priori.* Can we distinguish clearly between a definition that corresponds to the world and one that does not? We cannot make this distinction a priori for in principle definitions are linguistic and phenomena–non linguistic. There is a good possibility that a word has no referent in space–time and this due to be checked.

"The electron has a trajectory." 'The electron does not have a trajectory' is the true dilemma in quantum mechanics. Because 'electron' is a theoretical concept and not a phenomenon, both theses are considered possible (Einstein and Heisenberg respectively). The coordinates can be known when the momentum is not searched for (Bohr's complementarity principle), yet are there such things as coordinates and momentum in the micro world? What kind of arguments could settle the dispute between realism and phenomenalism? This bears witness to the existence of a speculative stratum in theoretical physics, the latter representing a fertile ground for philosophical speculation.

251. '*Possible experience' is a speculative concept.* Categories have no validity outside 'possible experience' (Kant). Yet Kant didn't imagine that the domain of experience is *undefined* by categories–within it they are both valid and invalid, depending on different situations, i.e. all categories are *conditional*.

253. *Testing of speculative concepts.* For every speculative statement it could be determined whether it has referent in the world or, to be more precise, if it has referent out of the system of statements. It is enough to eliminate the theoretical definition of a concept and to check whether the concept in question has bearing on something definite in space–time. If there is no such thing, the concept is speculative and cannot be thought of as if it was in the world.

254. *Etymology has no cognitive value.* Speculative philosophers undertake a search for 'authentic' meanings of the words they use. Heidegger seeks the origin of important entities and concepts in the ancient Greek language while at the same time he loads them up with 'authentic

meaning'; for instance $\alpha\lambda\eta\theta\varepsilon\iota\alpha$, non-obscurity, should be read as 'truth' ("On the Essence of Truth', 1993, p. 37). However, the indeterminacy of the word cannot be reduced by means of etymology. That is true to an even greater extent for cases in which philosophers uses translation of the original thereby focusing on their own idea of its philosophical meaning.

The history of word and concept is vast; there are different and non-linearly ordered meanings that are not defined along the lines of penetrating into the depths of the world. Words are created in the natural life process, far away from philosophy. Philosophy takes them away of natural language, changing and interpreting them in the process.

255. *The fall from sense of Kantian antinomies.* Is the world finite or infinite in space and time? How can we decide? According to Kant, both propositions are provable a priori. Yet there is a problem that Kant didn't foresee. This is the expansion of the horizon of 'possible experience' beyond ordinary phenomena and ordinary abstractions of finite and infinite, divisibility and indivisibility. That's why Kant's formulations of the antinomies are ordinary classical abstractions. They turn out to be inadequate both in astrophysics and atomic physics.

256. *Speculative meaning of life.* If one does something in order not to attain sensual pleasure but rather to reach speculative, mental end such as 'truth', 'beauty', 'good', 'sublime', perfect', then the attainment of the goal is also speculative and mental only.

257. *A concept is relative to a phenomenon.* Concepts entangle themselves in phenomena. 'The conceptual' as non-distinctive somehow mixes with 'the phenomenal' and with all attempts to speak in a 'purely empirical' way. This is easily described in the context of relativity. The empirical is winded together with the theoretical, a phenomenon is winded together with a concept and only then the two pairs have meaning. A pure concept is no longer a concept and a pure phenomenon is no longer definable as a phenomenon.

258. *Reduction of theoretical concepts (terms).* Scientific concepts often contain elements that do not directly correspond to observations. Such concepts, for instance, are the positive and the negative charge in electromagnetic theory. As a pair they are speculative and only their reference in the phenomena of 'attraction' (accession) and 'repulsion' (moving away) inculcates them in the world. Strictly speaking, neither attraction nor repulsion is available in the world. 'Particle' is also a speculative concept as we never actually observe the movement of discrete charged particles. The real referents of these concepts are electromagnetic phenomena, rays hitting photographic plates or sounds of Geiger counters.

260. *Linguistic transformations reduce determinateness.* Language is not infinitely flexible and cannot endure random combinations. It *grows weak in the series of transformations of the parts of speech.*

Correct sentences such as 'The beinging being beings beingly', 'The nothinging nothing nothings nothingly' cannot be related in their segments to elements of reality. These expressions do not express a world although they could seem as meaningful ones in certain ontological systems.

The substantializing of *the predicate* into the form of *the subject* is being avoided in our natural language. Out of an artificial context, nobody says 'The being of redness is a phenomenon' or even 'The apple's redness is strong' because expressions such as these perplex and hinder the life of the linguistic community. People are right when they say 'I see red' and 'The apple is red' instead.

Transformations of the parts of speech are inevitable beyond natural language in every single conceptual system and yet they are radical acts which deform experience.

261. *Entropy of speculative analysis.* Creating of a speculative concept is at the expense of the determinateness of the world. 'Necessity' loses actual regularity.

Concept after concept, meaning after meaning, statement after statement are put down and positioned in the speculative process without any logical necessity whatsoever. Indeterminacy increases exponentially with every new judgment. Meanings multiply, the spectrum of ambiguity broadens, the indeterminacy of the world expands.

262. It is a naïve continental prejudice that assumes science is but a conceptual system. Hegel even defines truth as 'scientific system'. This tendency is available ever since Plato and the Eleates and in the New Age its origins are in Descartes' geometrical attitude. A newer prejudice is that there is 'openness' of essential truths, an obviousness that escapes the relativity of language and perception. This is what thinkers such as Husserl and Heidegger rely on.

263. *Sciences do not proclaim necessary and universal principles.* Galilean and Newtonian formulations of 'natural laws' are erroneously conceived as universal and necessary truths. Galileo and Newton do not maintain anything about the Universal and the Necessary. They *postulate theses with common form* via which *facts and observations* are *explained.* The postulates in question are by no means necessary, universal and eternal and their constant *change* within the framework of science confirms that.

Contrary to that, empirical concepts are considered as 'inferior' and worthless for philosophy. Husserl uses 'epoché' precisely in this sense–elimination of assertions about external objects that belong to natural science and relying on pure transcendental 'experience' only.

264. '*Justification of sciences' is a continental European utopia.* German philosophers undertake the justification of various non-philosophical sciences without hesitation: *physics*: Kant, Hegel; *biology*: Schopenhauer, Schelling, Hegel; *sociology*: Fichte, Hegel, Schutz, Bourdieu, *psychology*: Wundt, Kant, Schopenhauer, Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Dilthey, Husserl; *logic*: Leibniz, Kant, Schopenhauer, Schelling, Hegel, Husserl; *grammatology*: Derrida. Besides, all of the above mentioned philosophers start their own entirely new fundamental science: *Critique of reason*–Kant, *Science of knowledge*–Fichte, *Philosophy of nature*–Schelling, *Phenomenology of Spirit*–Hegel, *Phenomenological Psychology* and *Transcendental phenomenology*–Husserl, *Fundamental Ontology* and a number of new philosophical sciences, constructed *en passant.*

265. '*The being of man' is not definable by means of speculation.* Is there a preserved mentally cultivated ground for speculative philosophy that deals with 'the being of man', 'death', 'ontological situation', and 'culture' without consulting science about these problems? Existential philosophy is imbued with a truly human passion: 'We are forsaken in the world'; 'We are being that questions itself'; "We are being-toward-death." (Heidegger). What can we say about the opposite models: 'We are sheltered in the world'; 'We are being that answers'; 'We are life'? Both of these passions are inappropriate. '*The ontological situation is an act of decision'.* Beyond decision is the fact that we live and we die.

The being and non-being of man taken categorially are indeterminate as related to a human being and its life. People are and are departing at the same time and when they die they are both gone and remaining at the same time. In both cases it is neither not nor non-not. A human being *is* and *is not* just like in the blue color there are white and black.

Situation is conceptually undefined. Ontology as a solution does not change the situation.

Chapter 14. THINKING DOES NOT REVEAL THE UNKNOWN

266. '*Was heißt Denken'–Heidegger.* The treatment is as follows. What does it mean to think? Man is a rational, thinking being, but it cannot think even if it longs to.

Philosophers are thinkers. They are described as such for thinking becomes dominant in philosophy. All this has nothing to do with science. 'The origin of the essence of being of what exists is not thought of… That is why we ask: what does it mean to think' ("*Was heißt Denken*?")

How should we consider this unique and so specific for Heidegger chain of thoughts that begins and ends with one and the same question? Transitions between concepts–nouns in Greek– are left without explanation and without an alternative to them.

268. "*Everything is….*"
"*Everything is being*";
"*Everything is spirit*";
"*Everything is matter*";
"*Everything is energy*";
"*Everything is strings*"...

Principles with the form 'everything is' are non-relative and thus–indeterminate. When there is nothing but being, nothing but spirit, nothing but matter, nothing can be defined as 'being, spirit, matter' as it is non-relative to non-being, non-spirit, non-matter. If there is nothing but energy or a superstring, then there is nothing determinate. If 'everything is in everything', then nothing is nowhere and if 'everything is one', then there is nothing at all. There is no hope for us to have experience with 'all', with 'every', with 'one'. In actuality there is no sense and inherent value in attaining 'the all' or 'the one'.

270. '*Obviousness' pertains to sentences.* Accepting obvious *statements*, indubitable *propositions* and taking them as reflections of reality constitutes a misconception. We never *observe obvious sentences and statements.*

274. When we use speculative concepts with unclear referents in the sensory world itself, it turns out that we are inevitably inaccurate, undetermined and easy to disproof. Things slip out of general concepts. The former are immeasurably more complex, unordered and irregular.

275. *Polar correlativeness is the origin of dialectics.* 'Concepts come to be their own opposites'. Yet we do not find *moving concepts*. It is just that one definition is carried out together with another. The act of de-termining delineates a terminus (border) and along with it– two sides. *A* defines *non-A, anti-A*. This mutual limiting and polarizing makes determinacy possible as *our own decision*.

276. *Contrary definitions are inadequate in one and the same aspect.* The Universe manages to be finite and infinite and neither finite nor infinite by virtue of its 'finiteness' being the 'closedness' of the curved space and its 'infiniteness' being the absence of end in this 'closedness'.

278. 'The essence is hidden' is a misleading assertion. If we know for something that it is hidden, then it is here, in space and in time and thus–it is discoverable. Obscurity is completely relative and pertains to something hidden in experience. '*Obscurity' beyond experience* is void of meaning and reality.

There are hidden but discoverable causes. 'Cause' is a handy construct not for some kind of essence but rather for events that are tied together in time. It only makes sense to speak about causes that are in the world. What realists do within the framework of quantum mechanics is inadequate. *Nothing can be hidden behind the world.*

The invisible which cannot become visible is mental. 'The invisible' becomes something when it is seen; before that it is but an assumption. And when it is seen, it is no longer 'invisible' and it is not 'internal' to an 'occurrence'; it is spatial and itself definable as an occurrence. 'Energy' is a good example in this respect. All interactions are exchange of energy and it is assumed that energy in the world is a constant value. Now, if we say that energy is an essence, how can we define it independently of forms of interaction? Such definition is empty.

280. *The non-relative is empty.* Relative concepts, non-rooted in the world, are void of world but the non-relative, left without counterparts, is void of determinateness.

281. "*Everything is reducible to On.*" This is a basic requirement of the mind. Monism marks the limit of generalization. Monism is a tendency of language; it is the limit of linguistic definition. Logic arranges concepts and statements in a hierarchy. On its top there is One. That is why the 'World has Beginning'. Yet in the world there is no special number, there are no numbers at all. Certain theoreticians from the domain of physics aim to complete a monistic utopia–'the uniform theory' or 'the theory of everything'. This Unified theory, at the current stage abandoned as 'superstring theory', will meet counter-evidence and will revise itself, replace itself and eventually vanish. The Unitary is a utopia because our world is limited and constantly immersed in chaos. It is inconstant, indeterminate, irregular, accidental and fragmentary. It is but a worldly flux in which new and unforeseeable events repeatedly take place.

An assertion about the Unitary has no guarantee in the world and cannot be confirmed for there is nothing that remains one and the same in the world. If we say that the Unitary is God, then what do we come to know about the Unitary and about God? What is obstacle for God to be plural? If we say that the Unitary is Nature, what more do we say than confirming the present plurality of the perceived world? If we say that the Unitary is the Transcendental Self, where is this Unitary when I am asleep? And how this Self does its job as Absolute when it has birth, it lives, it asks, and it dies? Whatever we think up about the Unitary, it is void of Absolute.

282. *To what is the 'One' reducible?* If the diversity is reducible to one, *to what is the One reducible*? Unthinking *two* and thinking only one leads to *unthinkability of the one* and deprives it of uniqueness. Indeed, if there is but one, how can we know that is precisely one when we have no other numbers?

283. *Does the nothingness say something?* If we relinquish the One, how do we approach the matter of the nothingness? "Nothing exists"; "Nothing does not exist"–which one should we choose? Can we look at it from the outside and thus check whether it is there? 'Find a place where you are gone!' Every thing has nothing in its base. But then what is substance–God or nothingness?

In "What is Metaphysics" Martin Heidegger put the question as follows: "How is it with the nothing?" (Ibid.). "We assume: nothingness precedes 'something and negation." "Anxiety reveals the nothing" (Ibid.). Heidegger points to something new: 'being-attunement'.

"This wholly repelling gesture toward beings that are in retreat as a whole, which is the action of the nothing that oppresses Dasein in anxiety, is the essence of the nothing: nihilation. It is neither an annihilation of beings nor does it spring from a negation. Nihilation will not submit to calculation in terms of annihilation and negation. The nothing itself nihilates" (Ibid.) (Translated by David Farrell Krell).

This powerfully expressed attunement does not represent knowledge about 'the nothingness' for the latter is assumed as non-relative, yet defined as relative.

285. *Negative ontology as ontology of the virtual*. This is the counterpart that I attribute to the nothingness. All things are virtual, conditional, non-separate, non-things; they are beyond being and non-being, beyond being-and-non-being (the Buddhist *śunyata*). Formlessness is the basis of all forms, just like water in the ocean is the basis of waves. Expressed as an *ontological view*, this position also degenerates into groundlessness.

286. Everything that can be said about a real world can be said in natural language. Its vocabulary is best adapted and richest since it's been describing the world for tens of thousands of years. Every artificial language can generate manipulation.

Chapter 15. GENERAL RELATIVITY

Due to the fundamental difference between words and phenomena, words that relate to essences alienate them from phenomena and make them look as if they were hidden in the core of phenomena. The general is the first ordinary category that is transformed into essence. It is culturally relative. Written symbols in Chinese cannot transform themselves and to express the general in a concept but nevertheless they express it via images.

287. *Relativity of identical–different*. Identity and difference are recognized only relatively, in particular definitions–the definition of color, for instance.

288. *Experiment with 'white–black'*. On the display black is black only in the background of white or of color. It is an absence of radiation or a non-illuminated fragment on the surface of the display. Furthermore, the words 'black' and 'white' are not mirror-images of phenomena; *they are of a different order*.

289. *Experiment with an object*. 'Vitosha' (a mountain in Bulgaria) is neither general nor particular. Its 'essence' is neither general, not particular. In the same way 'man' is not general and not particular in the same time. This is confirmed by the fact that *genomes of one and the same species are not identical in two different representatives of this species*.

290. '*The general' as subject and as predicate (as property)*. The general, when understood elementary, is what is common in the variety of things. For Plato it is the subject to whom attributes belong. For Aristotle, however, it is a predicate in a relation to a subject. As Wittgenstein notes in *The Blue Book*, the subject somehow *has* the predicate as a part or a core. Thereby the predicate is defined as *a property*.

Let us exchange the places of *predicate and subject (castling)*. Just as apple is *round*, so the roundness can be *apple–oid*, i.e. with the form that is specific to an apple. Which one is part of the other one? Which one is characteristic to the other one? Which is 'general': the roundness or the apple?

291. Eventually the general is only approximate and the world takes us by surprise. In every general truth we find a border and difference and in every difference we find a border and identity.

The general is not general among things themselves but among speech and practical conventions and eventually in the *world in which people live and which they share with each other*.

293. '*The general' economizes energy*. Multitude, indefinite quantity, infinite number of objects and events can be designated by and imbued *in a single word*.

294. *The general is accidental*. 'The general' is accidental, not necessary. First, it is accidental by virtue of *the fortuitousness of local language*. Second, because of *the fortuitousness of the type of 'logic'*: Aristotelian predicate logic, Stoic judgmental logic, modern

logics, Vedic logic *Nyaya*, Buddhist logic –all these are different logics and different forms of 'the general'.

Third, 'the general' is accidental due to *the fortuitousness of categorization principles*. Aristotle's system is grounded on one principle; Kant's system–on a second principle; Hegel' system–on a third principle. In every one of these three systems 'the general' is a different category. Wittgenstein's 'families' are 'general' without covering identical definitions at the same time. Biological taxonomies are similar to them.

Fourth, the 'general' is accidental because of *the fortuitousness of category*: the selection between multitudes of qualities or things that are brought under a common concept.

Insofar as the general is accidental, the entire verbal-categorial knowledge is accidental. Knowledge varies from culture to culture, even if one and the same objects are recognized by representatives of different cultures.

295. *The general is an artifact.* After all general forms are *teleologically determined rhythms and forms of human life* in its re-synthesis away from chaos.

296. *The general is erroneous.* There is no way for any general concept to endure disapproval on the part of the world, provided that it is not analytical concept or a tautology.

"*Everything is matter.*"

Refutation: "*Thought is not matter.*"

"*All people are mortal.*"

Refutation: "*Dying is but a transformation of life.*"

297. *Unreality of 'general' and 'particular'.* Nominalism denies the reality of the general. Yet if the general is unreal, the particular is also unreal.

298. Generalization is *synthetic inductive process of thinking-up.*

The reverse process is towards the sensibilia and is 'unthinking'.

300. '*The universal' is a hypostasis.* In order to have universality, we must find a definition that is *necessarily inherent in everything.*

303. '*Absolute' is an empty word.* 'The absolute' is a category with no referent in the world. The word 'absolute'–complete, all-embracing, infinite–as philosophical category is centre and ultimate end of metaphysics. The counterpart of this word is the word 'relative'. But with partner such as this 'absolute' is discredited: for it becomes relative in its relation to 'relative' and thus–'non-absolute'.

305. *Absence of absolute attributes.* There are no absolute attributes, i.e. there are no attributes at all. For instance, if there was only blue color it would never occur to us that it is a color and that there are other possible colors beside it; it would never occur to us that this diversity of colors is what makes this one color 'blue'.

306. *Absence of relative attributes.* However, relative attributes are also non-inherent in objects for they dissolve in their own relativity. Attributes such as 'old', 'father', 'short', '177 cm high' are but correlative definitions, 'two-place predicates'; a separate relative attribute is unthinkable and indeterminable by itself.

Chapter 16. 'THING'

208. "There is no mind without things and no things without mind" (Dogen). The very distinction between 'mind' and 'thing' is conditional. The thing is dependent on its definition or on its place in a life process within a local culture.

310. *Dissolution of the 'thing'.* Something like an 'apple' is not an indisputable worldly form; it is a collective noun. It is an unfixed family of fruit species. Something becomes a form

when it is included in a life process–perception, imagination, thinking, action that facilitates the (re)synthesis of the life form. Every single (particular) thing can be unthought so that another can take its place; anything can dissolve into other things.

312. *Cross-cultural comparison.* Things are processes and processes are things. "In the *Hopi* language 'lightning, wave, flame, meteor, puff of smoke, pulsation' are verbs… In *Nootka*, a language of Vancouver island, all words seem to us to be verbs, but really there are no classes 1 and 2 (nouns and verbs)] we have, as it were, a monistic view of nature that gives us only single class of words for all kinds of events. 'A house occurs' or 'it houses' is the way of saying 'house', exactly like 'a flame occurs' or 'it burns." (Whorf, 1956, 215–216).

314. *The name indentifies the thing.* The thing could be spatial, temporal, spatial–temporal and also it could be beyond time and space: a virtual thing such as 'information' or 'love'. Denomination is the decisive act in the synthesis of the thing.

The discrimination of the world into things and events, into actions and processes, of self and object takes place in the language. It is then when categorial divisions, syntax and grammar appear.

315. *Dependence on purpose.* 'Table', 'legs', 'drawer', 'stapler', 'parentheses', 'vases' are not things in themselves, they are not 'Dingen' in Heidegger's sense; they are *artefacts, virtual things* . They reveal themselves in the context of their usage and name; outside of it they are meaningless units without essence.

317. 'The thing' requires an explanation, a cause and thus specific causal chains come to be differentiated. Without 'thing' and 'event' there is no causal chain and thus there is no need of an explanation.

319. A 'window' is practical, intellectual and linguistic achievement. It is unknown to cultures in which windows are not produced and used.

Chapter 17. ARCHEOLOGY OF 'BEING'–FRAGMENTS

"Being–non-being' is a Western topic. In the perspective of the profound reflection on the world which incorporates the direction East–West, this topic overlaps with Eastern topics such as: Sanskrit–'bhāva' (being, essence, nature), 'śunyata' (emptiness); Chinese–iou 有 (exists, there is), wu 无 (does not exist, there is not), 存在 shēng cún (I exist, existence), 道 Tao (way), 心 hsin (mind). Our questions are: *to what extent the questions about being and non-being are dependent on language, to what extent they are not aware of language, captivated by language and deceived by language?* Let us introspectively examine (in accordance with our 'archeological' technique) fragments of crucial texts.

322. "*Does the external world exist?*" Even if we are able to *prove the unreality* of the external world we do not change our way of life in accordance; we still live as those who believe in the external world. This shows a natural dis-claiming of what has been proved by means of words. Ignoring of 'proofs relating to the outside world' makes the very question meaningless and situates it in linguistic contexts only. 'External world' is obviously relative to 'internal world'; however, there are differences in the way and the place in which the demarcation between them is cut. 'Existence' carried into the language is already beyond the security which perception can provide.

323. *"Do Pegasi exist?"* Something in the *language* is already available if I speak to someone about it. And when I say that this thing exists or does not exist I imply that *there is such a thing* if only as a topic of conversation. This has nothing to do with sensations and perception.

The 'topic' or the 'object' is simply available. And this 'topic' or 'object' does not represent necessary existence in space–time, Being or Non–being. Outside of language and thinking there is no other domain in which we find existence, except quale, sensibilium, sensation, experience.

324. *What does the copula say?* Even if grass does not exist here and now, it can have green color. Even Pegasus, which is not existent somewhere in space and time, has its own characteristics–for example, it is a 'winged horse'.

Whether something is available or not available in the world of man before the word of man and is available for all the people is not a matter that depends on the *copula* 'is' and on its presence and absence in specific languages. The availability in question is not verified via the language but rather via the life.

Thus 'is' does not bring existential sense into assertions that attribute properties.

326. Umberto Eco mentions 'the modern objection that Western metaphysics with its idea about being is generated in a single discourse based on the syntactical structures of Indo-European languages, i.e. on a language that applies the structure subject–copula–predicate to every statement... Yet the experience of being is imbued in the baby's first cry out. (Ibid. p. 33–34). This experience however leads beyond 'being' and 'non-being'.

328. "*What exists is what we talk about.*" According to Quine the disagreement between a man who maintains that there is something and a man who denies that there is something is based on ontological premises. They are rooted in the paradoxality of the negative affirmation that 'something does not exist' (Quine, 1952).

We do not have any guarantees of existence except expressions, associated words. Intralinguistic existence can no longer be affirmed outside of language.

330. *Indeterminateness of existence without language*. 'Hand' is not a differentiated thing. The distinction of 'hand' from 'body' as 'body part' is purely provisional. There is no 'hand' in the world itself; there is only the distinction we make between 'hand' and 'body'. My hand does not exist as it is not a separate thing. And yet here it is before me. It is then that we are confronted with the first difficulty: existence is relative in an unclear, vague way.

331. '*Being of the existing*'. Martin Heidegger establishes the Greek expression *to on* (the present participle 'existing') as the origin of the understanding of being his article "Was ist das–Philosophie?" (1966). Scholasticism puts the stress on 'ens', being. We become dumb witnesses of the innermost conversation between Heidegger and the 'Greeks' in which the two sides exchange single words or short phrases with profound meaning.

332. The separation of 'being' from 'existing' is void of a referent. We say "The man died" and we maintain that the man no longer exists. her/his being is lost and is now non-being. Yet by this we do not separate being from existence as in precisely the same sense we say: 'He/she no longer exists'.

332. '*The phenomenon being' in Being and Time (1927)*. Heidegger proceeds with the concept *phenomenon* as follows: "φαινόμενον is deduced from the verb φαινεσυαι which means 'to show itself'; thus expression '*phenomenon*' signifies that *which shows: itself in itself*, the manifest" (Ibid., § 7). *Heidegger does not point to an example for such usage of the word* φαινόμενον. But how could the latter be 'as such' when: "There is even the possibility that the existing could show itself as it *is not* really is as such" (Ibid.).

333. *Dasein.* This is how *Dasein* appears in *Being and Time*. Sciences, as relating to man, have the same way of being as this existing (man). Heidegger turns over terminologically this existing as *Dasein*.

Dasein a generality that does not only reside among the rest of the existents. Rather, it is differentiated onitcally by virtue of these existents concerning this very being in its own being… Ontical distinctiveness of Dasein is grounded in its condition: that it *is* ontological' (Ibid.).

Every living being is concerned with its own existence; that is why the referent of Dasein expands beyond the sense in which Heidegger introduces it.

335. *Linguistic analysis of Heidegger's being.* As a keen observer, Heidegger reaches to the important linguistic analysis of 'being' (*An Introduction to Metaphysics*): "Verb, infinitive, substantive are accordingly the three grammatical forms which determine the word character of our word 'being' <das Sein>… Two of the three, verb and substantive, are among those which were first recognized at the beginning of the Western grammar, and which today are still regarded as the fundamental forms of words and of grammar. Consequently our inquiry into the essence of substantive and the verb takes us into the question of the essence of language." (Heidegger, 1959, p. 55–56).

"Western grammar', 'substantive and verb' pertain to 'essence of language'– identification made without an attempt to look into foreign linguistic forms. A fatal mistake: in many languages (Chinese being the first of them) these forms are not available. Like Hegel, Heidegger also does not realize the relativity of German (and European, Indo-European) grammar.

'Is' is the *third person* of the auxiliary verb 'be' which would mean that 'being' before an observer and thus–that *it is not absolute*. 'Be' looks more natural than 'is' as a being in the sense of 'Dasein', 'being-in-world'. However, 'be' in Descartes' usage is problematic in the same way as 'is'. 'I am' is also relative to another person and thus it does not permit expressing an absolute being: where there are subject and predicative, there cannot be a non-relative being.

336. *Hegel's 'pure being'.* "Being is what is immediately undetermined; it is free from determinacy in relation to essence and any other determinacy which it could receive inside of itself. This being without reflection is the being as it is immediately in itself.

Being, or the immediately undetermined, is in actuality *nothing* and nothing more or nothing less than nothing…" (*Science of Logic*).

Let us examine this elementary and seemingly perfect beginning of *Science of Logic*. The immediate in question is the stream of the world and thereby it is not 'pure being' but rather 'being–non-being'. And in 'pure being' there neither purity (otherwise there wouldn't be anything at all) nor being (otherwise it wouldn't be a beginning). Thus 'pure being' as a beginning is not necessary.

Is 'nothing' the necessary negation of 'pure being'? If this is the case, another solution should be impossible. Let us check if it is.

The possible options are: A. 'pure being–pure non-being'; B 'pure being–existent being'. I do not see why either of these two options should not be as necessary as 'pure being–nothing'.

'Being' could be differentiated as an experience of mental state; for instance 'pure being' would correspond to a pure mental state, void of intention, and 'existent being'–to a mental state of perception.

'Being–nothing–becoming'. Options: A. Being–nothing–becoming; B. 'Being–nothing– disappearing'; C. Being–nonbeing–transition'; D. 'Being–non-being–annihilation. All four figures are equally possible and meaningful.

Therefore the in scheme which only A is affirmed is accidental.

339. *Kant: 'Being' is not a predicate.* "Being is evidently not a real predicate, that is, a conception of something, which is added to the conception of some other thing" (*Critique of*

Pure Reason, London, p. 368, transl. by J.M.D. Meiklejohn,). The statement *god is almighty* contains two concepts with their objects–god and almightiness; the word *is* does not constitute an additional predicate and its only function is to position the predicate *in relation* to the subject.

"Whatever be the content of our conception of an object, it is necessary to go beyond it, if we wish to predicate existence of the object." (Ibid., p. 369).

These clear formulations are ignored by Hegel.

340. *Analysis of 'is'–Aristotle: Metaphysics.* What is the starting point of European metaphysics regarding the central concept 'being'? Let us listen what Aristotle has to say: "There is a kind of science, whose remit is being *qua* being, and the things pertaining to that which is *per se*… So the elements, too, of that which is must pertain to it not accidentally, but *qua* thing that is." (*Metaphysics, Gamma* 1).

This 'being *qua* being' is a *final object to which no predicates can be attributed*. However, as such this subject remains non-relative and thus–indeterminate.

Aristotle points on equality of being with predication in a sense: "there is no difference whether we say 'the healthy man *is*' or 'the man is healthy', 'the walking (or the cutting) man *is*' or 'the man walks' (respectively 'the man cuts') and so it is in all the other cases" (Ibid., *Gamma* 6). This is not in accordance with *Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotle's 'being'.*

341. *Parmenides' being-think.* We reach the gene of European ontology–Parmenides' 'being-think'. Being as unalterable (Parmenides) has no worldly referent just as 'non-being'. There is no way to get 'the being of what exists' as a referent before thinking.

Aristotle. *On Generation and Corruption*: "Proceeding from such arguments, they, not paying attention to the senses [and their testimony], neglecting them and assuming that one has to follow [only] the reason, have proclaimed that the Universe is unitary, static and some of them–that it is infinite… Within reasoning this apparent looks orderly yet in practice such views are close to madness." (A 8, 325a)

It is time for us to look into a non-Western Indo-European concept of 'being'. Otherwise we won't find out whether the topic 'being–non-being' as we have followed it up to now represents a Western cultural form, Indo-European cultural form or a global cultural form. In order to do this, we have to *identify the West* in the background of other cultures, only in relation to which it is definable as West.

342. *Cross-cultural observation: Brahman in Brahma-sutra.* In India Vedic schools have studied and debated on 'bhāva' (being). Sankara Acharya, the greatest of Indian metaphysicians, begins the commentary of *Brahma-sutra* as follows: "From the established fact that the object and the subject, which respectively constitute the content of the concepts 'you' and 'we, and are by their nature entirely different, not unlike light and darkness, could never be logically identical, follows that their attributes also cannot be identical." (*Shancara commentary of Brahma-sutra*).

Atman, or Self, is a substance, different from the body, the no-Self. Both here and in India we find substance, attribute, Self, body–there is an overlap between Indian forms and Greek forms. This could be described with the kinship between the Indo-European languages.

However, there are differences between Indo-European and Chinese forms: in China it is not spoken about substances and attributes–in language there are no substantives that are categorially related to attributives.

343. *In 'Catuşkoţi'–'the four-cornered formula'–existence and non-existence are formulated in a unique way.*

"*Everything exists.*"

"*Everything does not exist.*"

"Everything both exists-and-does-not –exist."
"Everything neither-exists-nor-does-not-exist."
The last statement is unknown to Western philosophy. It is not known to philosophy as a whole before Siddhartha Gautama.

What is new in philosophy here is that *all four statements are turned down* and this is not a logical operation. Their nullity shows the nullity of the kind of definition via absolute categories–*the nullity of defining the world as being/non-being*.

345. *Subject–predicate questioned: Motion is paradoxical.* Nagarjuna's solution is that there is no motion as in the walker there is no movement, i.e. the walker remains unchanged–he walks. 'The moving moves or 'the walker walks' *is just syntax, not a phenomenon that we can find in the world*. Here we have *indeterminacy of world in relation to language* or vice versa.

Thus Nagarjuna manipulates similarly to dogmatic philosophers, yet in the opposite direction. In fact, unlike conventional thinkers, he makes the decisive step by demonstrating the incapability of strict logical language.

347. *Non-Indo-European thinking of being/non-being.* Being–non-being–non-non-being (*Chuang Tzu*) (IV B.C.). "There is a beginning. There is a not yet beginning to be a beginning. There is a not yet beginning to be a not yet beginning to be a beginning. There is being. There is nonbeing. There is a not yet beginning to be nonbeing. There is a not yet beginning to be a not yet beginning to be nonbeing. Suddenly there is nonbeing. But I do not know, when it comes to nonbeing, which is really being and which is nonbeing. Now I have just said something. But I don't know whether what I have said has really said something or whether it hasn't said something." (*Chuang Tzu*, 2, B. Watson's translation).

Different translations and the Chinese original of this text show that existence and being are indistinguishable: not by the author but by the language. *Being–non-being–non-non-being*. Such a triad is not considered in Western thought. If non-being or nothingness is existent, then how it is different from being? What does 'non-non-being' mean, how can we think about it? Chuan Tzu has shown that the opposition 'being–non-being' which supports 'being' is fictitious and that it is the second negation that indicates the emptiness of this opposition. *What is the semantics of non-non? What about non-non-non? There is no such semantics* and this means that the non-relative 'being' is also void of semantics.

348. *Chinese language: being (existence).* In formal Chinese (mandarin) there is a verb-particle-conjunction (是) pronounced as 'shì' and translated as 'yes' or 'there is'. 是 is not grammatically determinate: it is neither a noun nor a verb. This symbol cannot be used to transform speech as to make it suitable for speculative reasoning as in those linguistic forms developed in Europe and India. It is evident that from Chinese are absent 'fundamental categories' pertaining to being/non-being and that there is no counterpart if Heidegger's 'essence of language'.

Chuang Tzu relinquished the being–non-being pair.

In summary: In the archeology of thought both in the East and in the West the category 'being' is not distinguished from 'existence'. The categories 'being' and 'existence' are absent from Chinese, yet are present in meanings such as 'existent' and 'available', 'real' and 'living'. In Buddhist thought being/non-being turn out to be entirely grammatical. In Chinese thought the indeterminacy of being is revealed.

All this shows that between the West and the East there is no shared 'Being' but rather a family of meanings, thoughts and symbols for a single world, which can be shared between the

West and the East and thus – become common to all mankind. However, a universal philosophy of 'being' cannot be constructed from them.

Chapter 18. ANALYSIS OF 'BEING'

"Is' implies a third person which means that 'being' is in front of an observer and thus it cannot be absolute. 'Is' is related to 'I am' and taken by itself it is indeterminate.

349. *Experiment with modes of 'is', 'I am'.*

The auxiliary verb 'be' is used in our languages in a variety of modes as to refer to perception, imagination, dream, and etc. "This tree *is* here. The tree *is* green." "I *am* on Earth yet I imagine that I *am* on the Moon." "My mother is there and she smiles to me–I dream of her." "I remember my father in front of the house." "There are no Pegasi." In these expressions of 'cogitations' '*is*' has no particular meaning. In all of these cases content runs through my mind. I am aware of something.

350. *The world remains.* I can empty my mind, I can even forget about its existence. Then the one who forgets can also disappear.

An image turns into an image. A form becomes another form. 'A' becomes 'non-A'. There is no 'eternal form' or 'being', yet there is neither a 'flux' taken non-relatively.

351. '*Is' does not refer to existence–Jespersen.* "At any rate, *is* in such sentences does not mean 'exist' for the contemporary understanding and when philosophers use sentences as 'God is' that is understood as unnatural transference of the normal usage of *is* as copula." (Jespersen, 1969, p. 133).

352. *Non-categoriallity of S–V–O–Sapir.* "In the Chinese sentence "Man kill duck," which may be looked upon as the practical equivalent of "The man kills the duck," there is by no means present for the Chinese consciousness that childish, halting, empty feeling which we experience in the literal English translation. The three concrete concepts—two objects and an action—are each directly expressed by a monosyllabic word which is at the same time a radical element; the two relational concepts—"subject" and "object"—are expressed solely by the position of the concrete words before and after the word of action. And that is all." (Sapir, 1921, ch. 5, 13).

353. '*Existence' without determinacy is empty.* 'Exists', 'is' without 'where' and 'how', without time and space, without identity check via indication, becomes a non-relative category. As such it is completely void of determinacy.

Analysis of 'becoming'. Becoming is a process of appearing of something ("existent being') in the world and its disappearing (dismantling, ceasing).

There is no way for being to appear out of non-being, neither to disappear into non-being. It is impossible being to become non-being because then there would not be being at all. There is no way for non-being to become being–nothing becomes of nothing.

In the moment of appearance and disappearance the status of the thing *is indeterminate*. It is not being, not non-being and thus it cannot be synthesis of both. We have indeterminacy.

The Buddhist '*annicca*' (Sanskrit: *anitya*; Pāli: *anicca*), *impermanency,* the stream of the world, or the Chinese '*Tao*' 道, *The Way*, are not syntheses of being and non-being. The stream of the world is neither appearance nor disappearance but rather *a change* which is change precisely by virtue of its *indeterminacy*. By the way, 'pure being', unrelated, is also surely indeterminate.

The scheme 'being–non-being–becoming' (Hegel) is adequate for natural language categorization, at least in our languages. However, if one takes a closer view, *the complex form–*

concept–name changes. And this complex can change with the changing of perception, concept and name.

Check-up. Transformations of water. Water as a translucent liquid (lacking taste and having critical properties) disappears as steam and appears as ice liquates. Thus speaks our perception.

If define water as a chemical compound H_2O (a name), it does not become neither steam nor ice. What makes water (the fluid H_2O) into steam or ice is heat or the 'kinetic energy of molecules'. However, H_2O changes in a chemical reaction. Water breaks down to oxygen and hydrogen. Then the atoms of hydrogen and oxygen remain unchanged but the relations between electrons are changed. The molecule of water dissociates. *Water actually disappears.* In a nuclear reaction helium is synthesized from two hydrogen atoms. In this process protons and electrons remain constant and unrelated to the chemical elements. On the even deeper level of annihilation the atom of the hydrogen changes into photons. Matter becomes energy.

All these trans-formations can be considered as combinations of quantum objects that remain constant. However, a multitude of quantum objects can be viewed as states of superstrings. That is, we could choose a position within which we can dissolve all these beginnings and endings in a fundamental 'potential being' which, however, can never be existent.

All these trans-formations can be considered as an elusive change of *something fictitious* which is a 'superstring' only nominally. That is, we could choose a position within which we can recognize all these beginnings and endings as non-being. Of course, this non-being cannot be 'Nothingness'.

357. *Quantum objects do not exist, do not non-exist, do not become.* In quantum mechanics there is no 'being' of quantum objects beyond their macro-measuring. Macro-effects such as spots on a photographic plate, distributed as a cone of particles or a cone of waves, are observed. The micro objects themselves *have* certain probability–Heisenberg, or, according to Schrödinger, there *is* a single object (wave) that can be localized in different places. This is inconceivable as it goes beyond what is perceivable, expressible and intelligible. In their interaction with the macro-level machinery micro objects are no longer micro objects.

In the 'micro world' there is neither being nor non-being. And of course, there is nothing that could unite in being–non-being and *oscillate between being and non-being* as becoming.

358. *The singularity paradox.* Attempts to write scenarios on the development of the Universe are speculative, yet, as far as they are mathematically correct, *singularities* such as the Bing Bang are assumed and represented via values such as 0 or ∞ for some quantities. In the singular event 'Big Bang' the very physical laws arise somehow. In the singular event 'rise of a *species*' a non-existent life form comes into existence.

If the world is thought as the zenith of our horizon, the maximum that we can possibly attain in our life, it cannot 'arise somewhere at some time' in the sense we put into this phrase. The world is *not 'something in space and time' but rather it is what shapes space and time.*

Science speaks paradoxically and unconvincingly about singularities. Why is that so? Because scientists do not realize the unsoundness of what is non-relative: what 'begins' and what 'ends'. When it is being theorized that a Universe or a black hole 'begins' or 'arises', 'ends', 'ceases' or 'disappears' in both cases we have inconsistent description. The law of conservation of energy cannot possibly be valid for the beginning of the Universe, yet it loses its consistency if its validity is restricted to particular moments in time and locations in space.

This borderline makes the situation inconceivable. Arising of time–ceasing of time, arising of space–ceasing of space, arising of physical laws–ceasing of physical laws, arising of a Universe–collapse of a Universe: all these phrases express nothing.

Physics treats such empty expressions far too tolerantly and this bears witness to the existence of a deeply rooted prejudice relating to the 'absolute'.

359. '*Śūnyatā*' (Sanskrit noun from the adj. *sūnya*–'void'), *'emptiness' in Buddhism is beyond being–non-being.* Emptiness neither is here nor becomes nor disappears. It is but a relative aspect of things, absence of substantiality, absence of essence and of static 'beingness'. A non-relative aspect of things is simply not evident; the thing can completely dissolve into its co-relations. Even sensory forms dissolve among themselves and into the human form. Thereby they can be easily unthought after we unthink the human form.

361. *Determinacy is available as a moment of life.* Things are determined when we compare and co-relate them. There is a non-relative reminder–for instance, the period after which the living becomes non-living and loses its independence. We determine in order to perceive, think, designate, and act (vital deeds) against an indeterminate background.

Chapter 19. METAPHYSICAL IDEOLOGY

362. *Replacement of the reality with an idea.* Metaphysics does not always entail a metaphysical ideology. Roughly speaking, ideology consists of systematic lying and deceiving, rooted in the relative truth that presents itself as absolute. No description of the world is a privileged one.

The projects for 'Happiness', 'Justice', 'Truth', and Being' are utopias. They are forced on different communities and individuals under the disguise of 'mission', 'struggle' and 'cause' and they impose upon us duty higher than life. Ideology is *inversed theory which, instead of being tested against reality, tries to change reality in accordance with its own measure* (kritische Teorie–Adorno, Horkheimer). Thought-up societies such as Plato's 'ideal state', Campanella's 'island', Fourier's 'phalanxes', Marx and Lenin's 'communism' are *totalitarian* because in them *all people are involved in the realization of an Idea.*

Today in Eastern Europe there is still a way of thinking that is struck by the ideology of a utopian *metaphysics of freedom and history*, created by Marx, Engels, Lenin and their followers.

The ideology of cogito results from the absolutization of thought. However, thought is not more than it is–it does not crate world, life, happiness. It is not substance or God, it is a human activity, i.e. an activity of the limited creature *man* and probably its availability is not confined to man only.

363. '*The West' as a 'World culture' blocks the horizon towards 'the non-West' and thus hinders its own definition.* In Euro centrism or Western centrism 'world' is indentified with 'West'. Yet it had and still has its counterpart in the face of non-Western ethnocentrism. China calls itself 天下 tien sya, 'under-heaven', world, 'chun guo', central country. Ancient Greeks used to divide people into 'Helenians' and 'barbarians'. Germans have considered themselves as 'chosen people', etc. These ideologies were repeatedly refuted in historical science. The same will happen to Western centrism, despite the global domination of science and Western economy; for in this type of centrism there is no global perspective and there is no awareness for the wholeness of one's own culture, relative to non-Western cultures.

Essentialist thinking is a fertile ground for the development of ideological nationalism. In certain periods of expansion of nationalist attitudes in Germany philosophers such as Hegel,

Nietzsche and Heidegger attribute to their nation and their culture special historical role as an heir to Greek culture, freedom and philosophy.

364. '*Cogito as an essence separates man from the rest of the living world*. The speculative differentiation of 'the thinking' tears man out from the rest of the world and makes us blind to the global life. 'The thinking' creates a spiritual world that separates humans from nature and makes them somehow 'superior'. Here the very concept 'superior' is inappropriate; for how can we evaluate 'nature' as different from 'spirit'? Here the falseness of idealism flashes forth.

The raising of 'man' in comparison with 'animal' is 'obvious' to the extent of building a wall between us and the other life forms. Metaphysics is to blame for the reinforcement and the stabilization of this separation.

368. '*Obviousness' can be deceiving*. "Wilderness is not a living environment. There is no person and no room for one in the wilderness." Yet this 'obviously true' statement can easily be replaced with the following one: 'In the wilderness we are no longer people and thereby we are beyond life and death. Thus we can readily stay there."

These are two contradictory statements which 'justify' two radically different attitudes, ideologies and cultures.

370. *Essentialist thinking in the West is rooted in the 'logos' attitude.* 'Logos' is the attitude that makes us project the form of the world in the language and to see all-embracing order within the world. In the ordered cosmos every essence has its place and the multitude of essences define which is what. There is no room for change and inexpressibility. There is no *respect for the unknown.*

378. '*The outlook' is both fortress and prison to Ego*. Even though we put down our glasses, our eyes remain in their places. The world remains here when we change our views. The person, as well as the community, adopts views that vindicate Ego not unlike the various interests that are being protected by ideologies.

Outlooks are conglomerations of opinions, tectonic plates that float on an ocean of attitudes. There is no truly holistic view–even the whole of science is not whole. There are separated pilings of coordinated or uncoordinated views about fragments from the world we live in. These pilings or families of views can belong to different 'philosophies' or 'theories'.

379. *Arguments are not investigations*. When I am defending a thesis, I use arguments. I *select* them. Thus they falsify *the conscious by virtue of its relativity* examination. Beyond the debate instead of argumentation of theses we perform *investigation of reality* in order to orient ourselves.

Every thesis can be defended in the context of a certain attitude and within a local description via the usage of facts and arguments. Different theses can work successfully in similar conditions and they work at their best when placed in the specific circumstances in which they were created. It is not forbidden to use context-specific descriptions in a life situation rather than universal ones; on the contrary–such an approach is favorable. Thus there is no room for debating.

This also holds in its entirety for theses within the framework of analytical philosophy which explicitly identifies itself with argumentation.

380. *Reasoning closes alternative paths*. In its every step it is a matter of choosing a solution; it can proceed in various directions. It is dependent on invisible attitudes, implicit and explicit premises, and pre-conceived meanings and thus it soars in indeterminacy. We tend to

forget the question: why is a decision given privilege at the expense of the rest? Why certain facts are stressed out while others fade into silence?

381. *Only the lived world is a decisive 'argument'*. Different theses and arguments have different value only because they represent one and the same world, against which they are tested. Powerful 'arguments' come from the world. Galileo's observation via telescope solves thousand-year old speculative disputes over celestial bodies.

Observation empties speculative reasoning.

In this sense the world 'judges' on views, yet without voicing opinion of its own.

382. *Freedom from ideologies*. Ideological and thought freedom is attainable through constant *realization of relativities*. Relative truth is not taken for absolute; the argumentation-based investigation is not accepted. *Relativism* can also turn into ideology if one simply thinks that 'everything is relative'. A free person is a person who does not follow blindly a description or a theory in a local language.

IV. UNTHINKING

Chapter 20. FREE MENTAL ATTITUDE

381. *Mental freedom*. Thinking over different thought and linguistic forms and ways is realization of one's own ways and free co-relating to them. Usually we do not realize the enormous mass of thought forms on which we are dependent and which act as our 'second nature'.

Their realization, unthinking, elimination and forgetting are conditions for personal change and for accepting those mental and behavioral forms that are most appropriate for certain conditions.

In this sense unthinking is freedom.

384. *Opening of the ego- and ethno-centric attitude.* Every attitude is egocentric and ethno-centric, yet there is a difference between *closed* and *opened* attitude and this difference is matter of degree. First and foremost, liberation is realization of an egocentric and ethnocentric attitude and opening towards a global horizon.

De-cogito is *rejection of the attitude that does not differentiate between language and world (between words/concepts and entities),* non-acceptance of the local as global, non-acceptance of the relative as absolute, non-acceptance of the accidental as necessary.

Here freedom equals to the attitude to think towards an unrestricted horizon, beyond the controlled, narrow and unconscious thinking. Diverse forms of thought are available everywhere around the globe and it is them that think over and make sense of human forms of life. We face new situations, test different thought forms and what is truly new provokes equally new thinking.

Liberation of the attitude makes the mind independent of thought forms. De-cogito is a precondition for a re-cogito that is free from the burdens of metaphysics, theory, and belief and in the same time brings about clear comprehension of forms in the space–time of life re-synthesis. Ego is reduced to a dynamic personality. Egocentrism, mental burdens, fixations, inhibiting habits of thinking, negative emotional waves and conflicts with other Egos are out-lived.

385. *Ego–de-cogito–re-cogito*. Re-cogito projects itself into *replacement of mental habits*–from dependence, unconscious identification and fixed thinking towards independence, conscious identification and free thinking.

Free thinking is aware of its forms. It does not fix categories, concepts and solutions for every situation. It creates new ways, here and now, in order to optimally empower life to the highest degree possible. It defines *one's identity in relation to the others.*

On their basic level, our thinking habits are '*unconscious metaphysics'*. The waves of thinking have to be quenched *in order for a clear mind to free up*–a mind that comprehends the situation clearly and profoundly. What comes after is re-cogito: summarizing, error correction, preservation of findings and initiation of new thinking.

When we have our mortality in mind and we realize that we can die on this very day, we do not have the time to repeat irresponsible, weak and destructive actions.

386. A person with an educated mind knows his/her culture and realizes its ethnical nature and global relativity.

We, people, are but a small part of the vast diversity of life forms on Earth and we live owing to these life forms. We all live together owing to the highly specific and fragile planetary conditions–air, water, earth, flora, and fauna.

Life forms are not created because of us; the planet is not built for us. We can destroy much, yet we are unable to restore what we have destroyed.

387. The non-free absolutistic attitude generates violence. Following 'the absolute truth' that has fused with our mind leads to regular attempts to impose it on others.

388. *Life is the only indefeasible value.* In the face of death all metaphysical experiments on life turn out to be shallow games. All can be questioned *except life*.

389. *The horizon of life exceeds the pragmatic situation.* Pragmatic situations are organized with a purpose, engaged with artifacts and are not spontaneous life. We have to do rational things which obviously weaken our life. The horizon of life exceeds every pragmatic situation. Our practical rational solutions cannot bear the responsibility for the life and are potentially dangerous to us. If market, technologies, sciences, arts and the enormous mass of texts, created up to now, separate us from other life forms, imprison us within concrete cages and put letters and numbers before our eyes, ruin our health and destroy our planet, make us consumers, robots and puppets in the hands of the men of the minute, this civilization is of no use to us the way it is.

Identity is ambiguous as distributed to achievements and defeats. Where are the achievements, there are the defeats–they are the backside of the coin. We have to *cleanse and open ourselves*, to decisively unthink the forms that weaken our life: the West as global, thought as reality, language as world, man as master of the planet, life as being and death as non-being.

Along the lines of 'the two sides of the coin' logic, our deepest delusions are in the same time our most profound truths: the 'Absolute', 'necessary', 'universal' truths and projects of the West which are in actuality *relative, accidental, ethnocentric.* The West cannot take the responsibility for all mankind and is not able to lead it to a vital future. Besides, it is not the job of a local civilization to do that.

This is the sense of de-cogito: it is directed towards re-cogito, yet not just as a replacement of one description and one program with another, but rather as constant awareness of *relativity*–of mistakes, delusions, conceptual dependencies, ideologies and *the arrogant Western ethnocentrism.*

392. *Virtual dependency.* The enormous expansion of the virtual horizon is in the same time an enormous *collapse of bodily life*. This process must be reversed as to avoid disaster.

394. *Realization of the Western unconscious.* A major part of our life lacks awareness and this is perfectly normal. It is not possible, not necessary and not healthy to be aware of everything all the time.

Our concepts are formed as a result of development that has been going on for thousands of years. Many intellectuals deconstructed them during the 80ties and the 90ties and declared that *relativism* is the way out. The postmodernist movement didn't realize the strata of the Western unconscious in their entirety and didn't define its forms and its limits in comparison with other cultures. The very project of the postmodernists was more literature than philosophy and as an ideology it opposed another ideology–that of scientism.

399. *Only the thought-up is unthinkable.* What is created in thought is subject to unthinking. Every thought-up thing can be un-thought of. When it is unthought, what remains is sensory perception. We cannot construct and deconstruct *the real world* as a 'place in which' *we are born, we live and we die*. The world exceeds free choice at least in the way in which the latter is understood in the West. We cannot choose whether to be born or not, whether to die or not, whether to be human or not.

400. *Un-thinking is positioning in a relation.* What I have called here 'decogitation' is different from non-thinking, from skepsis, from critique, as well as from relativism. De-cogito is not just an intellectual position. It is a attitude towards attaining *clear intellect, clear perception and clear way of life. This is freedom in and from the thought-up world.*

401. *Culture and awareness of 'the optics' of the human form.* This world exceeds us, its elements being immensely powerful. Our bodies, we ourselves, are part of the world and in the same time *optics* through which the world shapes itself in the stream of our human life. It is naïve to assume that 'our thinking is infinite', that 'our possibilities are unlimited', that 'Reason will prevail', and that 'things will put themselves in order'.

Our thinking has human form; it is like the mental flux of every other creature: consistent with the creature's form. Our optics is ineluctable and impossible to transcend in this world; that's why the world is enigmatic and this is precisely what makes it a wonderful and magnificent world rather than an alien and appalling one. The world is alien and appalling and we are 'forsaken' in it only from the point of view of the attitude that seeks Absolute essences and eternal foundations of existence and consequently does not find them. It is a utopia to hope that we could come to know the infinite and boundless worlds by means of our limited body and finite mind. It is a fantasy to assume that we speak and act on God's behalf and that we are able to manipulate world and life. The belief that a theory of electromagnetic radiation explains the colors we see, or that biology will make us immortal, or that technology will build perpetuum mobile, or that social thinkers will build the perfect society, is but a delusion, generated by scientific ideology.

Chapter 21. TECHNIQUES FOR UNTHINKING

402. *Error, elimination, refutation.* Unthinking is the basic recognition of an erroneous thought and its refutation. The error could be logical incorrectness, mistake in the interpretation of experience, meaninglessness or inadequacy.

In modern logic, *Modus tollens* is a form of refutation:

If P, then Q.

$\neg Q$

Therefore, $\neg P$

Or: $[(p{\rightarrow}q).\ {\sim}p] \rightarrow {\sim}q$

403. '*Philosophical proofs*'. If axioms and definitions are free, then *what has been proven is also free*–it is pre-determined in its premises. Virtually *everything that can be said can also be proven* from the right premises. Thus *philosophical proof as plain entailment has no value*.

Philosophical reasoning is questionable in its entirety because of the *driftage of meanings*. One and the same term could be used in different meanings and in different phases of the discourse by virtue of its indeterminacy in its relation to the world. Yet a single alteration in meaning could entirely change the line of reasoning.

This brings about skepsis regarding philosophical proof and philosophical discourse as a whole.

409. *Un-learning*. In order to learn something new, one has to eliminate something old that occupies the same place. In order to learn to do something complex in the right way one must un-learn the wrong way of doing it.

410. *Dis-claiming*. Here dis-claiming is a term that refers to decogitation of pro-claiming. Our claims have vaguely realized or unrealized form that does not withstand its check against experience.

411. '*Meditation*'–*realization of the unrealized.* All forms of de-cogitation require to a certain extent a form of *realization of the unrealized, i.e. a focused meta-cogitation.* By virtue of its purpose and its practice the latter is close to *meditation practice* where a clear mind observes the mental flux from a distance.

412. Research techniques in the current investigation.

Recognition of key fragments of cogitation in Western and Eastern thought. These key fragments are new achievements or decisive modifications in formulations, positions and attitudes.

Clear forms of expression in the history of thinking. Here we do not interpret texts but rather closely observe the shortest expressions of new or crucial thought. These expressions are tested as thought forms and linguistic forms in experiments on thought and language. Analyzed forms are inspected and a search is conducted for clear forms in which new solutions have been adopted throughout the history of thinking.

Refutation of descriptions and explanations mainly due to their involvement in virtual concepts and assertions, constructed from pure grammar that remains unrealized in its relativity, locality and non-reflectiveness towards the world.

Dissolution of seemingly solid forms: if the forms in question are virtual ones and have purely linguistic character.

Reduction of obsolete mental and linguistic forms: forms whose function can be undertaken by other forms.

Along these lines most powerful are the more complex operations of:

Relativization: The definitions of a concept or an expression are revealed in their relations with other concepts and expressions. It is shown how step by step the concept is dissolved in an entire network of concepts and thereby loses its apparent independence of meaning.

Distillation: The non-separated perception (experience) is separated from the concept, the word, the category, the opposition.

Archeology: observation of artifacts present in the cultural strata of the West and of other, non-Western, linguistic artifacts.

Cultural anthropology: comparing of analogical forms in various major cultures.

Archeology and anthropology complement each other.

417. Where there is deconstruction, there was construction. And where there is deconstruction, there can also be re-construction. Deconstruction is knowledge of construction. *Only deconstruction shows the construction* that has been build without us knowing about it.

418. *Dissolution into indeterminacy.* Key concepts, ideas, beliefs, views are dissolved. Even perceptual forms can be dissolved. All that is non-relative hangs in the space.

419. *Regression.* Unthinking is similar to the dissolution of a sediment.

We start with the surface of a thought and reach its roots–'the concept'. Tense spots, the spots where thought is set in motion and a concept is created, are discovered. These spots are key ones for Ego, nation, culture, civilization. Thought 'genes' are revealed and read.

There is nothing thought-up that cannot be unthought:
– the categories in relation to the world;
– local categories in relation to foreign ones and to the world;
– abstract concepts in relation to reality;
– conceptual forms as grammatically determined forms;
– thought dependency: every thought dependency is 'bad', especially the unrealized one.

421. Unthinking and disclaiming represent the development of the method or the thought experiment of *re-construction*, which was started in the West within the project of the British empiricists and further developed by Kant via the question *"How it is possible?"*

422. Via precise re-cogito we reach the end of language and the beginning of perception.

424. *Thinking without language.* If I have eliminated language, would I be able to think and if yes, how I would think?

If we can say something, we can also think of it. But can we think of it without saying it?

We can unthink the linguistic thinking of sensory objects by eliminating the designation system but this does not mean that we have stopped thinking. We still *think via co-relation of sensations, perceptions, and images.* This is comprehension.

Chapter 22. DISSOLUTION OF CONCEPTUAL FORMS

425. *Realization of the form of questions/answers.* The form of the question is created by the attitude, the mental situation and the local form of communication. The form of the question determines the form of the answer. "What sort of man is he really?" presupposes *essential* definition of someone's already presupposed essence. Other forms of answer are eliminated. The change of perspective is expressed with a different form of question: "Is this how he behaves in situations such as this one?"

426. The changing of attitude sets a new horizon of thinking. "Are there attributes of forms that can be transformed into the rest of the sets of attributes?" "Are there elementary formal attributes?" This illustrates the *change of perspective* from classical towards non-classical science of 'the micro world'; in the latter the meaning of 'divisibility' disappears. Thus the question: "Is matter infinitely divisible?" falls away. Thereby the cogitations of 'spatial uninterrupted matter' and 'indivisible atoms' are unthought.

427. *Illusion of 'true meaning'.* 'The profoundness' in interpreting concepts towards 'inherent authenticity' is an optical illusion. It represents the existent measurable depth as *an obscured fathomless profundity* or as an object that is to be 'revealed'.

428. *An example for unthinking a concept: 'intention'.* Instead of 'intention' or of 'directing the consciousness towards an object', we can speak about 'focusing' or 'outlining of an object'. Thereby *we do not differentiate between consciousness and object*. We have focusing, not directing of consciousness.

429. *'Noesis' and 'noema'–a subject–object linguistic form.* The structure 'consciousness–directedness–objects' does not reveal itself to the conscious one. How should we distinguish between *noesis* and *noema* without the concepts themselves? This is a linguistic figure of the declarative sentence in the Indo-European family of languages.

431. *Un-thinking 'thing'.* 'A thing' is a concept or a spatial–temporal form or both. Its perceptive form can be seen. The perceptive form is different from the mental one. If concept and name are separated from thing yet there is a detached spatial–temporal form available, then the latter is real.

436. *Dissolution of a 'number' into a 'count system'.* Let us relate different symbols to a single number. Let us write down: $1465_{10} = 100010000_2 = 2170_7.$ How much is that in the world itself? Does the thing that at first is 1465_{10}, then 100010000_2, and then 2170_7 precede these symbols? To the best of my knowledge, the question has never been put in this form. The answer is: *numbers are relative to the count systems* or, philosophically formulated, *numbers are relative to the symbolic system of the digits.*

We realize that there is no such thing as a number independent of symbols.

437. *Distillation of a perceived set.*

Let us check whether the number $1465_{10} = 100010000_2 = 2170_7,$ where the indexes show the count system, corresponds to something real.

After all, this number can refer to the quantity of something (for instance, marbles). Whatever this quantity is, in the world it will remain independent of the number. Before us we have many marbles. When we count them, we inevitably use a count system. If we eliminate the latter, we simply say: marble, marble, marble… or: here it is one marble, here it is another, here it is another, etc.

Thereby we attain incommensurability between language and world.

438. *Virtuality of language in relation to the world.*

A. It could be maintained that every predication is inherently *contradictory*: *"S is P."* Thus, it becomes clear that predication cannot be real–it is virtual.

B. We can exchange the places of subject and predicate in a phrase without loss of meaning: 'white snow–'snowy whiteness'. Thereby we demonstrate *indeterminacy of grammatical categories in the world.*

C. We can show that *naming is paradoxical*: 'I am Stoyan'. Thus we demonstrate the virtuality of name in the background of human reality.

D. We can perceive *different subject–object forms* in different languages and thereby we can realize the locality or the relativity of our asymmetry 'subject–object'. In Japanese ("*Watashi wa kono hon ga suki desu*", "I like this book") there are *two grammatical subjects* designated by the particles *wa* and *ga*–something unimaginable in our local grammar.

The role of the subject is played by a noun, by an adjective or by an adverb and this is completely alien to our Indo-European grammar.

E. One and the same thing can be said via different grammatical forms: 'I will die', 'Death awaits men'.

F. This shows that there are no determinate categories in language (unless we use our own categories to arbitrarily express foreign grammars through them) and consequently that

there are no determinate categories in the world. This shows also that even the most basic utterance leaves 'the form of the phenomenon' and pours out into a specific form that is alien to the phenomenon.

439. *Dissolution of the 'object' into the life form.* There is no 'objective physical reality'. 'Physical reality' is but a name, a perception of a living body. Water with its form, color and tactile properties is unimaginably different to the man, to the dog, to the shrimp, to the jelly-fish and to the fish. Even abstract scientific terms such as 'molecule', 'atom' and 'electron' are dependent on human perception as they are verified and receive physical sense only in the process of observation.

440. *Dissolution of 'being-in-world'.* 'Being-in-world' (the fundamental Heideggerian existential) is an ordinary understanding for existence in the world. 'Being-in-world' is a holistic yet divisible form, in which I am situated in the world. First and foremost, this means that I am different form the world. Thus I come into the world from the outside (in Heidegger's words: 'forsakenness'). *There is no way for me to imagine my own being outside of the world and thus– within the world.*

Being that is in the world is also a world or perhaps 'a part of the world'. If it is not a world, then only the domain that is outside of 'being' is the world. The world in which this being 'beings' is then 'an external world'. What do I experience as 'external' to my own being? This is a matter of delineation of a borderline. The latter cannot be drawn between the consciousness and the world, between the living body and the world. The borderline between the living body and the space–time around it is available. Yet the borderline between consciousness and world is not available.

If everything is world, than the world is completely dissolved and becomes non-relative, i.e. loses its meaning.

What then is the '*being* in world?

But what does 'in' mean here? Indeed, there is no other notion of 'in' besides the one of fitting a form into space or including a moment into time. It is an asymmetrical relation. If the being is in the world, the world should not be within the being.

Yet in the conscious being presumably there is a world–the world of the consciousness, thoughts, feelings, sensations. Or are they out of world? But then how are they in-world?

It is possible to construct an inverse existential: 'world-in-being' ("The whole world is in me: body, sensations, thoughts, self"). Yet if 'being-in-world' and 'world-in-being' are equivalent, they annihilate each other and are reduced to simple expressions.

441. *Unthinking the 'givenness' of the world.* 'The world is given to me' contains two instances: 'world'-"self" and 'giving'. The opposite expression would be: 'I take (receive) the world'. Yet no self precedes the world in order to be able to take it. In the background of the dissolved consciousness 'the world' also dissolves as something external to consciousness. Unthinking one of two related concepts leads to the unthinking of both of them.

442. *Unthinking 'time'.* 'Future', 'past' and 'present' also constitute a linguistic thought. They are unreal as far as every one of them is defined in its relation to a particular moment and thus future becomes present and past (McTagart). They are 'now' rooted in our actual sensations; yet 'now' taken separately from 'then' is no longer 'now'.

'Left' and 'right', 'front' and 'back', 'up' and 'down' are valid only in relation to the body that lives on Earth. 'Up' and 'down' disappear as soon as we enter the orbit of our planet. 'Left–right', 'front–back' are inconvertible for a particular body.

443. *Weakening of sensory forms. Dream image.* The dream image is thought of as an *illusion* and disappears when one wakes up.

Mental picture. The mirage, although visible by all participants in a desert trip, disappears under the effects of motion.

Perception. Thought-imbued perception falls away when unthought. Conceptualized perception of 'something' dissolves into pure sensations after it has been unthought.

Sensation. Sensation is problematic with a view to its elimination, yet it is imperfect and changes constantly. Colors are felt only when they are winded together in pairs and triads.

Chapter 23. UNTHINKING 'THE SPIRIT'

Here I investigate retrospectively the European philosophical concept 'spirit', ger. Geist, in an archeological series of crucial forms.

Geist. In contemporary German the following meanings of Geist are acknowledged: 'mind, thought, spirit, ghost'. In German 'geist' preserves the same wide spectrum of meanings as the English *spirit*, the Bulgarian and Russian *duh*, the Greek ψύχή, the Hebrew *ruah*, the Sanskrit *atman*; in the same time, the *spectrum of meanings of 'soul' and 'spirit' is shared and lacks internal borderline.*

'Geist' in German idealism. From its ancient meaning as thin gaseous matter, vital force, pervading all life and infused by a creator, 'spirit' turns into completely disembodied, ideal factor, substance, absolute, and God when it encounters the notion of a Holy Spirit. In the utmost degree this transformation is preformed in German classical philosophy.

446. '*Absolute spirit'.* Hegel's absolute concept for spirit: 'eternal in itself and for it itself existent idea, eternally manifesting itself in action, generating itself and enjoying itself as an absolute spirit' (Ibid. § 577) is subject to many commentaries and criticisms. It is worth noting Feuerbach's replacement of this concept with 'self-consciousness' and its 'turning downside up' by Marx as a 'social consciousness'–reflection of 'social being'.

448. *Spirit of culture and Geistwissenshaft. Humanites and sciences.* Hegel shapes the paradigm in which the domain of culture differentiates itself as an inherently human reality (*spirit*) that concurs with the forms of culture–art, religion, philosophy. In correspondence with this, the sciences of spirit (Geisteswissenshaft) separate themselves from the sciences of nature (Natürwissenschaft).

The rest of the world does not make the same distinction between culture and science. It is not implemented to the same degree in Britain and America and is not fixed in the Far East.

Dividing science into natural sciences and culture sciences *screens* an enormous domain– the *sciences of life* which do not formulate universal laws as 'Natürwissenschaft' does, but rather *identify such forms not unlike the cultural.*

450. *Spirit of God, heb. Ruah yahveh.*

Looking back into the Old Testament we find:

Job: "Then a spirit passed by my face; The hair of my flesh bristled up." (4:15)

Exodus: "You blew with Your wind, the sea covered them; They sank like lead in the mighty waters." (15:10)

Genesis: 'The earth was formless and void, and darkness was over the surface of the deep, and the Spirit of God was moving over the surface of the waters." (Genesis 1:2) (*New American Standard Bible*, 1995)

Here we find different meanings of 'spirit of God' which flow into each other: *tangible* yet elusive substance that 'haunts', 'passes over'; *infused* power, will, reason, knowledge; breath,

whiff and thin substance that 'sweeps'. In all these instances *Ruah Yahveh* is not a human being, love, will, or knowledge, but rather a force that can 'implant' itself in man.

'The soul' along with 'the spirit' is a vague thing that can vary from pure immateriality to fine air-like matter. Thus spirit and soul in Hebrew, Sanskrit, Greek and the other Indo-European languages overflow and dissolve into 'respiration'/'breath'. How can we talk about an 'authentic' meaning here?

Ψύχή, psyche, soul. The meaning of this Greek word is described in dictionaries approximately as follows: 1. Breath, wind, soul, vital force, life; 2. Soul that is separated from the body, spirit, a shadow in the underground kingdom. 3. Living being, person, man. 4. Soul as a collective concept for all internal (mental) activities and properties; mind, understanding, consciousness, thoughts, spirit, feeling, heart, bravery, desire, inclination, attitude, impulse, yearning, passion, appetite.

The Chinese/Japanese 心 'hsin/kokoro' (mind, hearth) has similar spectrum of meanings.

Thus it becomes clear that 'spirit' and 'soul' overlap. *Without any limits the psychical associates with breath, with the living, with the bodily.* The most ancient semantic stratum includes the spiritualization of everything in nature. In this global shamanic sense 'spirit' is everything that moves and acts within the world. We also find it in pre-Columbian American cultures.

454. *'The holy' and 'the mundane', 'the sacred' and 'the profane'.* Is there a thing within the world or outside of it that is 'the sacred' and can the validity of every single ethical theory be tested against their own object–'the sacred'?

In the higher levels of Buddhism and especially in Zen Buddhism the sacred, as a *fixation in dependency*, is subjected to *a massive* unthinking process. The Buddha, who is held in high esteem, turns into dependency opposite to its original meaning–*freedom*. That is why Zen masters depicture the Buddha in carnal, repulsive images. The saints are 'grumbling old men' and the 'Buddha-nature' is 'this cypress', 'three measures of linen', and 'a piece of dry shit'.

"He opened His mouth and began to teach them, saying:
Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the kingdom of heaven." (*Matthew*, 5:2, 5:3)

458. *'Spirituality' is in the words.* The spirit has imprisoned itself in 'the shadow of all shadows' (Plato) via 'logos'–that is, it is not imprisoned in the body but in the words. 'Spiritual' are those people who create texts and try to persuade others that truth is a matter of words. A lifeless ideology is being propagated–that the body is a source of evil and that the spirit as Word is immortal. This is an insidious replacement of the relative and misguided word with the transcendental Creating Word of God. Yet word is 'immortal' and outlives its author only insofar as it is not and never was alive.

Thus *from the spirit of life we reach to the spirit of words*–a transformation that *replaces the real with the virtual.*

459. *'Humaneness' and 'humanism'.* Humaneness is a practice of offering compassion and support. 'I am a human being' already implies 'I am life' and as such I cannot exist without all animate and inanimate that constitutes my environment. When ideologized, humaneness is no longer what parents, kind people, physicians, and teachers do; rather, it is a textual meaning - 'humanism' to which science is 'cold and inhumane' and according to which 'humane' is reserved for pathetic talking and writing, the pathos of 'the human' and 'the humanity'.

461. *Spirit–it stands for life.* It is remarkable that Indo-European languages keep the understanding that human spirit is identical to breath, to *life*. Breath is respiration, *life*, not an idea. Only the dead body is spiritless, not unlike the bare sign taken by itself. The overflow of

the meaning of 'spirit' into 'soul' and of the meaning of 'soul' into 'body' leads to this understanding. There are no determinate separate essences such as 'spirit', 'soul' and 'body'; these words intertwine and their *meanings flow back and forth between them.*

467. Spirit and flesh pervade each other mutually and separately via their *indeterminacy and the absence of borderline between them in the world.*

468. Life exceeds meaning and in the same time it is the source of 'meanings'. The mystery *of the world* is beyond 'meaning' because all attainable meanings are in the world and from the world. Meanings are applied by us on the things we make and find. Meanings and values that float 'over the being' or in the 'ideal world' are locally philosophized and absolutized categories. 'Enlightenment' is the clear comprehension that the world is unexplainable and that *life is beyond all meaning.*

Chapter 24. FREEDOM FROM EGO

470. Ego is delineated within stable networks of self forms related to other people. In these different relations *Ego is different.* With different people and different situations Ego acts, speaks and thinks differently. Different people know Ego as different personalities.

471. *Dignity, pride.* The Greek word $\theta\nu\mu o\zeta$ (timos) translates as 'enthusiasm', 'anger', 'pride'. The Japanese word 'kao' ('face') translates also as 'dignity'. These are the ancient and the Far East variants of what I call Ego here. This 'core' of a human individual carries so much meaning that at times it is considered more important than life. Yet the majority of people sacrifice this innermost virtue precisely when their life is in danger.

472. *Social ego-complex.* Here I use 'Ego' as 'the man of position', 'persona', the unique personality within which our social life amongst others is experienced. Ego is socially situated–it is where other Egos are. Other Egos identify and accept/reject Ego into communal forms of life that re-synthesize: family, group, community, society. Ego is a social projection of the life of an individual human form that re-synthesizes within the individual life process amongst others. This connectedness to others defines one and thus generates limitations. Ego requires energy to re-synthesize and survive. In networks of dependencies Ego replaces the unique human being because of the need of the former to assert itself. In this respect Ego is dependency, non-freedom: we constantly strive for recognition, success and acceptance in the community and thereby we drown the voice of our innermost self.

Ego is culturally relative. In the West Ego is in the pivot of social life. In the Far East Ego is reduced to a part of the community: the individual is sheltered by her/his relatives ('amae'), loyal to her/his parents ('chu') and is duty-bound to serve the community ('giri'). Ego, just like the self, is not substantial or unconditional. It is an aggregate of experiences, a soaring cloud in the sky that changes its form.

473. *Anatomy of Ego.* Ego is a virtual form. Its form is not present in space. It is a virtual form. Ego's form is not a single complete form. It is a network of families-forms. Ego is a virtual counterpart of the body–it is an individual mental form with dynamical outline. The forms of Ego are temporary, mobile and virtual, yet they cannot last forever. They are attitudes, thoughts, mental images, actions. Like the body, Ego enjoys attention, care, love and suffers when subjected to disregard, rudeness, and hatred. Just like the body, Ego hurts when injured.

474. *Ego forms and de-forms the world.* Ego's form outlines the form of 'the personal world'. The world as a description varies according to Ego's form. Ego '*bends' (forms) the world*, so that it can preserve and reinforce its own completeness. This is more important than concerns about 'authenticity' and freedom because we survive in a social environment.

Ego's form is the form of inter-Ego relations in which it the centre–a key position that has to be held. In this social centre or 'zero position' Ego forms *a thought up world* according to its own form. Ego has personal *beliefs*–durable opinions justified via personal experience and personal culture. We *select* observations, facts and explanations that gravitate towards the re-synthesis (the expansion) of Ego's beliefs.

475. *In a debate, Ego acts as a 'personal opinion'.* Every remark in a debate is projection of Ego–a relative and spontaneous endorsement of Ego. Ego is endorsed in front of others. Variations of our point of view corresponding to the change of our opponent and the time of the debate are symptomatic of this phenomenon.

Ego is non-freedom insofar it is unrealized and uncontrolled. It blocks the path towards itself and thus–towards the other self. Ego closes possible paths to different thoughts and actions, to a different environment and culture, to a different position, to an alternative point of view, to understanding the foreign and the alien, and to a development in new directions.

477. *Unthinking the attitude.* Attitudes that tune our mind to certain forms in the world, in the language and in the culture and in the same time alienate it form other forms are visible only when one rises above them or blocks them; yet, they carry with them great energy.

478. *Liberation from Ego.* One who is free from the illusion of Ego's authenticity attains selflessness and thereby reaches a free position, an unrestricted horizon that is open to everything different and new. If we are left with the dilemma: to live and to be 'nobody' or to die here and now as 'somebody', we will feel the force of the living self in the background of the thought-up Ego.

479. *Realization* is a decisive stage of liberation. The unconscious becomes conscious; we perceive it and come to control it: we can preserve it, change it or remove it from our life. Realization is a pre-condition for the elimination of an Ego-form.

480. *Absence if subject in the world.* Wittgenstein: '5.632: The subject does not belong to the world, it is the limit of the world' (TLF). Yet 'the transcendental Self' is neither beyond the world. For *if the Self is outside of the world and observes the soul, it is no longer a Self–it is something nameless.*

481. "The real Brahman does not fail into views." (*Samyutta Nikaya*, v. V, 796–803).

482. *Dissolution of the 'I'.* 'I', the first person, has no person outside of its relation 'I–you–she'. It has no name and individuality. 'I', 'You' and 'She/He/It' are relative. They go together grammatically.

The expressions "I am concentrating." "You are concentrating." "He is concentrating" have one and the same value. Therefore this 'I' is not a unique transcendental Self; it is every self, i.e. *every person* as we perceive her/him. Not 'I' but 'something within me' is concentrating. But if there is no 'I' neither can be 'something within me' for 'me' is but a transformation of 'I' from subject into object. Outside of concentration there is no concentrating 'I'.

Who am 'I'? The name, the opinion of the others, the character, the biography, the body, the soul? If I remove 'I' from the consciousness, it does not disappear. 'I' is the consciousness that is immediately available, yet nobody has ownership of it and thus it is not particularly mine–it is 'linked together with the body'. Therefore a 'transcendental Self' does not exist and the world is 'given' not to a 'self' but to a 'consciousness'.

The expression 'my self', regularly used in our culture not unlike expressions as 'my trousers' and 'my face', is deeply paradoxical. The 'self' is expressed as an object that belongs

to… whom? To the self. This again shows the conventionality of grammar, its non-commitment to things as they 'are' and its focus on communication.

I proceed with the unthinking. I find out that there is no border between consciousness and self, i.e. that consciousness dissolves after the self has fallen away.

Who asks 'Who am 'I'? Is it the same person for who I say: "I am concentrating?" If there is another self, which reflects on the first one similar to 'self-consciousness' and which is aware of 'consciousness', I discover that it is inseparable from consciousness. I could simply think 'I see' at first and then I could think: 'I am aware that I see'. Is this a jump from the immanent to the transcendental? I do not apprehend such motion. Both selves are one and the same–they are me, a conscious embodied individual.

If every self has its body, then where does the self end and where does the body begin? When the tip of my little finger hurts, is this a soul or a body? Is it a self or a non-self?

Chapter 25. DE-ONTOLOGIZATIONS

484. '*Arising'*. How should we describe ontologically the arising of something out of nothing?

"B arises from A." But how can something arise of something else since the latter does not contain the former by definition? Another option is the thing to arise from itself. But how can something to arise from itself when it is already there? It is dialectics' turn. "B arises from B and from A.", that is both from itself and from the other. Yet it is not possible something to arise from the combination of itself and of the other when it cannot arise from itself or from the other separately. The final option is: "Something does arise neither from itself nor from the other." In this case there is no arising.

The way language works in ontology requires *deontologization* of "B arises from A.", "B arises from B.", "B arises from B and from A.", "B does not arise neither from B nor from A.." That is because natural language refers indeterminately (Quine), yet in ontology we require complete determinacy and that is too much even for the best of languages: the natural language. It is an ordinary tool for communication via which we announce experience that our fellow human beings can understand.

355. '*Change' is a para-dox.* Change cannot be expressed correctly. Of course, the concept 'change' is not empty and has its meaning–that is the change in the world, the stream of the world. But in the moment we include 'change' into a statement, we fail into a paradox: 'A becomes B'.

A does not become B even when we observe how A passes into B. For there is no way A could remain as a subject of the change. When we say: 'This man changes', in the same time we imply: 'This man stays the same'. In one and the same person old definitions have faded away and new ones have replaced them. Even after these elucidations the paradox is not eliminated– the subject–predicate form of the statement has suspended the change due its *grammatical incapability* to express it. This is a limit of language that seems to be insurmountable.

Thus, strictly speaking, change is indeterminacy.

485. *Scientific theories of arising are problematic.* To this day there are no satisfactory explanations of arising: the arising of language, the arising of *Homo Sapiens*, the arising of life, the arising of the Universe. These theories are generated by a false question: 'How does *x* arise'? With its very definition x is already wrong by virtue of being named, conditioned, and relative–it is something that *does not arise independently of its naming and its definition.*

Questions with the form "When did *x* ('Bulgarians', 'nation', 'science', etc.) arose?" are speculative. These *x* have 'arisen' in the moment they were named 'Bulgarians', 'nation', 'science'. Even if we find enough interstitial forms in the world, ordered chronologically, that does not prove the assertion that they have arisen from each other.

Singularity. Time, space and the laws of physics somehow arise in *the Big Bang* yet the arising itself is not with them. Where are then the 'symmetry' and the 'universality' of these laws? And how does something arise beyond time?

Thus we are free from false questions and answers pertaining to the topic of *arising.*

488. *Cultural-anthropological analysis of S–P.* It turns out that all languages of the Indo-European family contain this form. People talk about identical phenomena by means of different grammars. The comparisons show that in other languages, very significant at that, such as Chinese, S–P is not available. "Our Indian languages show that in suitable grammar we may have intelligent sentences that cannot be broken into subjects and predicates… When we come to Nootka, the sentence without subject or predicate is the only type. The term 'predication' is used, but it means 'sentence'. Nootka has no parts of speech; the simplest utterance is a sentence, treating of some event or event-complex." (Whorf, 1956, p. 242).

489. *De-ontologization of subject–predicate.* It is not determinate whether the predicate belongs to the subject or is separate from it. Does the attribute 'black' belong to 'this board'? It seems it does for color is a property of the board. Yet *the very same board* could also be white. It is not determinate whether the predicate is relative or non-relative as a predicate. The same basic predicate 'black' is impossible without relation to non-black, to 'white'. It is not determinate whether the predicate is common or particular in relation to the subject. When we say 'black board', the black is not defined as only this particular black or as black in general. Here we necessarily should remind of the reversibility of the subject–predicate relation: white snow–snowy whiteness. The latter clearly shows the lack of independence both in 'subject' and 'predicate'. Yet as a whole the subject–predicate unity could be easily assimilated into inconspicuousness. In English 'black board' is a whole word: 'blackboard'.

The non-relative logical subject is not a subject, therefore it has no substance.

The relative logical subject is subject only in its relation with predicate and this is a local linguistic form.

Thus we are free from false questions and answers pertaining to the topic of subject–predicate such as: what is x, what are the properties of x, which is substantial–the subject or the predicate? This frees us from an enormous network of untenable opinions and beliefs, of questions and answers, problems and theories, ontological dilemmas and metaphysical systems.

490. *De-ontologization of subject–object.* Grammatical subject can be reversed. From 'I am watching the sunset' we get 'The sunset is being watched by me'. It seems that in the world there are no subject and object insofar as we have the passive voice in our linguistic arsenal. Yet the sunset is not able to watch me. We have authentic asymmetry here. However, this is not a 'categorial' form but an asymmetry of the phenomenon: the body perceives something outside of itself. The intentionality S–O is explained with the body and the body is in an environment. This is *a worldly form of an animate body in an inanimate environment.* This is how the asymmetry 'human–sunset' is made sense of. The same 'directedness outwards' is at the same time 'directedness inwards': light permeates through the eye.

While I am watching the sunset, I do not see the structure S–O anywhere.

S–O for a transcendental subject is an a priori construction. There is a flaw in it: if the subject is transcendental and *independent of the world, why do we speak of the world?* The answer of the question about the origin of the world is unclear.

If the subject is taken as transcendental this leads to the disintegration of the relation subject–object. The same happens if the object is transcended out of the consciousness. Husserl makes both of these mistakes or rather both of these modifications of a single mistake–assuming intentionality as a constant feature of consciousness.

Thus we don't have subject–object form in the world. This form is reduced to a categorial opposition with a referent: embodied living in an environment.

491. "I saw in the city a great fire, burning with flames higher than thirty feet." What is it that I speak of here? The grammar says that it is the 'I' (the subject); common sense says that it is the 'fire in the city' (the object). Moreover, the object here is associated not with the subject but with the verb (Jespersen).

492. *Relativity of S–O with respect to a grammatical scheme.*

A. If the language we observe has structure that is not similar to the structure of our language then it is a matter of assessment which form is subject and which one–object.

B. A non-substantive can also be subject. In Japanese both subjects, main and auxiliary (*ga* and *wa*), can be nouns, adjectives, attributes, adverbs. In the sentence 'Kyou wa genki desu ka' (Are you healthy today?) *the subject is 'kyou wa'–today.*

493. *Phenomenal dissolution of S–O.* Let us ask: in the phenomenon (not the sentence) *watchedsunset* where is the watcher and where is the watched?

It is not me, Ivan Petrov, my name that is watching this sunset. 'Ivan' cannot see.

It is not me, 'the human being' that is watching this sunset. 'Human' is the name of my species and therefore–it is a convention.

Then who is the watcher? The body that I call 'mine'. But there is a serious problem–nobody is here. There is a 'self' only if there is somebody else, but if it is only me, then I won't identify a watcher at all. There is only watching sunset.

Now follows the question: what differentiates watching from sunset? Is there a non-watched sunset and watching a non-sunset in watching sunset? What a knot! I cut it in two with the obvious reply that there is no such difference. Then what are we supposed to say–'watching'? Yet we would not differentiate 'watching' if we had no 'hearing' and no 'touching'. 'Sunset'? But if it is only the sunset how can I come to know it and to recognize it as a sunset?

Seeing has no grammar. 'The seer who sees the seen' is an obviously tautological expression. The whole grammatical structure that is unfolded here is completely useless *for the seeing.*

What remains from the subject is a pure experience which is associated with someone's body and is not fixed categorially and grammatically.

494. *Experiment in unthinking a 'thing'.* Unthinking goes into depth, starting with the name of the thing.

'*Cypress*'. No, 'cypress' is but a name. I see a tree with such and such shape, a tree that has its strain and its variations which gradually pass into a different type of three.

'*Tree*'. No, 'tree' is a convention: is the bush a tree? It is a matter of word.

'*Plant*'. No, 'plant' is not determined in the world. Is the mushroom a plant? According to botany mushrooms differ from animals and plants, but this, of course, is a scientific convention.

'*Animate*'. Even this is indeterminate–the virus is neither animate, nor inanimate.

'*Object*'. Yet this object is whole with soil, water, sunlight, air. Separated from these, the tree dies and this object disappears.

'*Thing*' The thing is connected with linked with other things into greater things and eventually–with the whole world. There is no 'thing'.

And is there a 'nothing'? There is no such thing–I cannot find it.

And is not a matter about something as nothing–something, for example 'flowing being'. Since it is flowing everything changes–birth and death–i.e. this is non-being. Yet it is not non-being for everything is here and no 'non-being' is observed.

Thereby we unthink cypress, tree, plant, animate, object, thing, nothing, being and non-being. What is left then?

Everything is here: the cypress beside this bench and me sitting on the bench.

495. *Experiment in unthinking an 'obvious philosophical statement'.*

"Everything is inside my mind." This is a philosophical position with its traditions both in the West and in the East.

But what is 'everything'? I see colors and forms in a limited horizon and spectrum, I hear sounds in limited horizon and spectrum, I touch only what is reachable for my body. I imagine things and fantasize about things; I remember things and expect other things. Is this 'everything'?

And what does 'in the mind' mean? If there are things in the mind then the mind is volumetric and thus if there is something inside of it, there must be something outside of it. Therefore, not everything is inside my mind.

But where is my mind? Is there such thing at all? How to differentiate 'mind' from sensation, perception, mental image, thought?

And what does 'my mind' mean? Is there an owner to whom the mind belongs? The answer could be that there is a Self who is the owner of the mind and that the latter is property. But this is absurd. Such statement is untenable even though it is understandable for most people.

This also holds for the statement 'Everything is outside my mind'.

Thereby section by section, element by element even the most basic statements turn out to be absurd. Nevertheless, they are ordinary everyday life statements and everybody understands them.

496. *Unthinking of customary thought/assertion.*

Let us try with something obvious to everyone:

"This hand is mine." How come 'mine'? Is the hand one of my possessions? The case is not such. How come 'hand'? The hand is but a part of the body and moreover it is not clear where it begins: from the blade-bone or from the shoulder? My muscles get across that border. Is a hand taken by itself still a hand? It cannot live separately and thus it cannot be a hand if separated.

The sentence 'I concentrate on this burning candle' is entirely conditional and meaningful in its message. This sentence does not need to be a thought or an internal speech act–its realization is enough. However, if it is thought or spoken out aloud we can analyze it. We can focus and express out disagreement as follows:

There is no 'concentration', there is 'attraction'. There is no 'on', there is 'of'. There is no 'burning candle'; there is 'something that burns'. There is no 'I', there is 'something in me'. Yet there is nothing in me too for 'I' and 'me' are pronouns and in reality they are an undivided whole that does not follow grammatical regulations. Beyond my concentration there is no candle.

Beyond the perceived candle there is no concentration of mine. Beyond the concentration on the candle there is no 'I' who concentrates on the candle.

There no 'thing that burns', there is 'burning'. There is no 'of' because 'attraction' goes together with 'flame' and 'I'. In this case can we correctly say: 'Warm flame attracts'? Again, it is a lie. There is no form in the world that could enforce the words 'attraction', 'bright flame' and 'attracted'. If we say 'I attract this bright flame' we would again have an impossible situation. If we were to simply say 'Here bright flame' we would lose 'attraction' and 'concentration'. But who concentrates. I.

Let us examine the reminder: 'warm flame'. What in the world could indicate that flame and warmth are separate? Are we familiar with non-warm flames? Even if we are, where is the borderline between 'warm' and 'flame'? Is there such thing as a flame in the world and another thing 'warmth' that can be added to 'flame'? Nothing like that! Flame is inherently warm. Warmth is its property.

Yet another lie. The categories 'object' and 'property' are derivatives of the grammatical categories (parts of speech) 'noun' and 'adjective'. But in the world there is no thing to which a property is applicable.

There is no separate 'I', separate 'candle' and separate 'seeing'. All is one and all is non-one; it is indeterminable.

Thereby we reach the inevitable conclusion that *whatever we say it is not 'a truth' in the sense of correspondence. There are no true statements*; there is differentiation between correct and incorrect communication of experience in a particular situation.

This liberates us from views.

497. *Relinquishment of meanings.* Meaning is indeterminable out of life. That is why the question about 'the meaning of life' is unanswerable. The Great Meanings of this world are not meanings beyond this life. We cannot imagine, truly think and attain Meanings beyond life and death–astral, karmic, divine or diabolical meanings.

Before we intervene with naming and names there are no 'meanings' in the world. Skies, earth, air, body, soul–these 'irrevocable ingredients' of life–are beyond all meaning.

499. *The world cannot be unthought.* The unthinking process *stops before the world*. The world cannot be unthought. It is an object on another level of 'de-cogito': un-seeing, un-feeling, etc. When we are unthinking a concept we cannot unthink the phenomenon that the concept represents or refers to.

Chapter 26. EMPTYING

500. *Emptying in relation.*

Something is red only in the color-spectrum, in relation to other colors. Unrelated, it is no 'red', but just 'dark'.

Something is human only among the non-human creatures. Out of this relation, man is just 'living being'. Etc.

The emptying of the expression can be illustrated as follows:

"Consciousness *envelops* the world."

"The world envelops consciousness."

"Consciousness *is within* the world."

"Consciousness *is outside of* the world. Consciousness is *against* the world'.

Taken by themselves, all these expressions are neither true nor false. Even in relation to other expressions the world does not judge for or against them. All ways of describing the consciousness in relation to the world are equally (in)valid.

If we withdraw into the pure reality of consciousness, we discover that co-relations such 'is', 'envelops', 'against' are nothing but metaphors for they are inadequate in their literal sense. However, if we remove the co-relations from consciousness and thereby leave the latter pure and non-relative it empties into indeterminacy. This can be tested.

501. *Emptying of time. Future, present, past.* Future and present events flow and turn into present and past events. Before is before only in relation to after, and after is after only in relation to before. Temporal predicates mutually empty themselves. What remains is the temporal irreversibility that cannot be emptied in our world.

I didn't exist before I was born. I was different as a child. My body was constituted by different cells and the content of my memory was different.

I will die and be no more. I will be different as an old man. Mine body will be constituted by different cells. My memory will consist in a different set of memories.

502. *Emptying in micro perspective.* Mine heart is not a personal one. The same holds for my lungs and my brain. Mine blood is not a part of me. The same holds for my lymph and my urine.

My cells are not me. Cells are constituted by organelles, organelles are constituted by molecules and molecules are constituted by atoms. Atoms are constituted by protons and electrons. Both protons and electrons are not particles until I measure them in a macro experiment. Without me experimenting with them they are beyond existence and beyond non-existence.

Thus my corporeal content is not a determinate existent. It is not being and it is not non-being.

503. *Emptying in macro perspective.* Mine body is a billion times smaller than the planet Earth.

The planet Earth is a billion times smaller than the Solar system.

The Solar system is a billion times smaller than the Galaxy.

The Galaxy is a billion times smaller than the Milky Way, the Mega-galaxy.

The Mega-galaxy is a billion times smaller than the Universe.

The Universe is probably not the only one.

Where am I?

We find similar reasoning in Pascal's *Thoughts*.

508. *Emptying of qualia.* Qualia are the undeniable living, experiencing of sensations, sensory perceptions, mental images, thoughts, and emotions. Here qualia coincide with phenomena.

Qualia are defined relatively to other qualia in a life process: pain–pleasure, cold–warm, happiness–suffering, enthusiasm–rage. They are defined in the context of the re-synthesis of life against chaos.

The perceptual is not the 'first level of knowledge'; it is the phenomenal world, it includes birth, life and death and it closes the circle of worlding.

Spherical form is not an angular one yet it is spherical in relation to the angular. If everything in our world was shaped in smooth lines the predicate 'spherical' would be empty.

On individual level 'man' is a complicated network of meanings without which, it seems, we would not be able to live as human beings. Those meanings that we accept as unconditional turn out to be local descriptions. They are not available cultures far removed from our own.

509. *There is no determinate 'world'.* In order to be consistent we have to admit that 'world' is also indeterminate. 'World', 'Universe', 'continuum' are words that refer to 'all', to what is before us, to what 'exists'… Yet if all is world the world is emptied into indeterminacy. If we oppose non-world to world in a sensible way then the world gains determinacy, although only a nominal determinacy: for 'non-world' is nothing but a name.

Taken non-relatively, the concept 'world' is absent along with the essence of the world. The word 'world' is extremely wide and as a concept it is vacuous. Yet this doesn't mean that what is here and now is the concept or the essence 'world'. The world as the actual stream of forms that subvert chaos cannot be unthought.

But in non-metaphysical philosophy we are bound to be constantly aware that there is no substance, no 'worldliness', no 'possible world', no 'this-world-ness' and other similar categories. The word 'world' is just a word; it is used relatively in clear contexts–here I used it to refer to flux of phenomena, experiences and qualia.

In the process of true penetrating into 'the world' we reach a level on which we cannot any longer say a single word about 'that' and even a word like 'that' is deceiving to us. Of course, I'm not the first one to note this.

510. *The Buddhist concept 'śunyata' (emptiness).* Things are empty not because they are nothing but because they are conditional, relative, descriptive, virtual. What is perceptual is void of absolute and being as such.

511. *Emptiness of 'the emptiness'.* Nagarjuna: "Emptiness as a view is empty as all other views." (MMK, 13.8). Early Buddhism did not develop 'emptiness' (*śunyata*) but 'non-self-essence' (*nihsvabhava*) and 'dependent arising' (*pratitya samutpada*). All of these three concepts are powerful, reach in application possibilities and multi-dimensional. Yet this doesn't mean that they are free from paradoxes and therefore–non-empty. That's why they should not be used for the construction of metaphysical systems and for argumentation of all sorts of theses.

512. *Liberation from cogitations.* Things do not have the borders that we attribute to them. *When seen at close quarters borders fade away.* Events overflow into each other. States change. Forms lose sharpness and transform, disappear like clouds in the sky, although slower or much slower than that.

Thus in the world there is nothing immovable.

Indeterminacy. Concepts, words and sensations submerge into indeterminacy if we remove the relations by means of which we recognize them. The thing empties into indeterminacy when we eliminate its relations with other things. A predicate is emptied if we eliminate its polar counterpart. Relation is emptied if we eliminate one of the counterparts. Relativity without relatives is empty.

Inconceivability. Concepts are void from world. If they attempt to face the world alone, without relations, they do not define anything and the world remains indeterminate to them. But even in a system the concepts relate to the world only externally because the entire system can be reduced to a single concept. There is no exit from a concept towards the world.

513. *Inexpressibility.* When we are free from cogitations the world is a miracle to the mind. We cannot survive in this world; it is intended only for the special state of emptiness. A miracle could kill if only because of the fear it causes. An ancient statue or a mummy that

embodies incomprehension is terrifying. The whole world is a miracle; if we unthink the habit of welcoming the day as an ordinary event, the world is wonderful, enigmatic and strange.

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